On Islam and Jihad

On Islam and JihadBy Dr Farida Khanam
A perusal of the Qur’an followed by a study of latter-day Muslim history will reveal a blatant contradiction between the two—that of principle and practice. Where recent developments in some Muslim countries bespeaks the culture of war, the Qur’an, on the contrary, is imbued with the spirit of tolerance. Its culture is not that of war, but of mercy.
At the very beginning of the Qur’an, the first invocation reads: "In the name of God, the most Merciful, the most Beneficent". Throughout the Qur’an, God’s name is thus invoked no less than 113 times. Moreover, Qur’an states that the prophets were sent to the world as a mercy to the people (21:107).
The word ‘jihad’ has nowhere been used in the Qur’an to mean war in the sense of launching an offensive. It is used rather to mean ‘struggle’. The action most consistently called for in the Qur’an is the exercise of patience. Yet today, the ‘Muslim Mujahideen’ under unfavorable conditions have equated "God is Great" with "War is Great." For them, the greatest reward is to be able to wield a Kalashnikov rifle.
In the light of on-going conflict, we must ask why so great a contradiction has arisen between the principles of Islam and the practices of Muslims. At least one root cause may be traced to historical exigency.
Since time immemorial, military commanders have been accorded positions of great eminence in the annals of history. It is a universal phenomenon that the hero is idolized even in peace time and becomes a model for the people. It is this placing of heroism in the militaristic context which has been the greatest underlying factor in the undue stress laid on war in the latter phase of Islam’s history. With the automatic accord in Muslim society of a place of honor and importance to the heroes of the battlefield, annalists’ subsequent compilations of Islamic history have tended to read like an uninterrupted series of wars and conquests.
These early chronicles having set the example, subsequent writings on Islamic history followed the same pattern of emphasis on militarism. The Prophet’s biographies were called ‘maghazi’, that is ‘The Battles Fought by the Prophet,’ yet the Prophet of Islam in fact did battle only three times in his entire life, and the period of his involvement in these battles did not total more than one and half days. He fought, let it be said, in self-defense, when hemmed in by aggressors, and he simply had no option. But historians—flying in the face of fact—have converted his whole life into one of confrontation and war.
We must keep it in mind that the Prophet Muhammad was born at a time when an atmosphere for militancy prevailed in the Arab Society. There being, in their view, no other path to justice. But the Prophet always opted for avoidance of conflict. For instance, in the campaign of Ahzab, the Prophet advised his Companions to dig a trench between them and the enemies, thus preventing a head-on clash.
Another well-known instance of the Prophet’s dislike for hostilities is his cessation of the campaign of Hudaibiya with a treaty which made more concessions to the enemies than to his own people. In the case of the conquest of Mecca, he avoided a battle altogether by making a rapid entry into the city with ten thousand Muslims—a number large enough to awe his enemies into submission.
In this way, on all occasions, the Prophet endeavored to achieve his objectives by peaceful rather than by war-like means. It is, therefore, unconscionable that in later biographical writing, all the events of his life have been arranged under the heading of ‘battles’ (ghazawat). How he managed to avert the cataclysms of war has not been dealt with in any of the works which purportedly depict his life.
Ibn Khaldun, the celebrated 14th century historian, was the first to lay down definite rules for the study and writing of history and sociology. He followed the revolutionary course of attempting to present history as a chronicle of events centering on the common man rather than on kings, their generals and the battles they fought. But since war heroes were already entrenched as the idols of society, the caravan of writers and historians continued to follow the same well-worn path as had been trodden prior to Ibn Khaldun. When people have come to regard war heroes as the greatest of men, it is but natural that it is the events of the battlefield which will be given the greatest prominence in works of history. All other events will either be relegated to the background or omitted altogether.
In the later phase of Islam, there came into existence a powerful group of Sufis—many of them great men, who exerted their influence on a multitude of people, their goal being to put an end to this contradiction between the tenets of Islam and Muslim conduct: they at least wanted to strike a balance between the two. But the Sufis failed in this, the principal reason being that they expressed themselves in terms of dreams and the realization of inspiration. The militant interpretation of Islam, on the contrary, was ostensibly based on history and knowledge. Dreams and personal realizations could, therefore, never adequately counter what had come to be regarded as hard facts. Objective reasoning cannot be bested by subjective postulations, and so the Sufis failed to establish the equilibrium between precept and practice which they so ardently desired.
In the past when the sword was the only weapon of war, militancy did not lead to the mass-scale loss of life and property as modern warfare brings in its wake. In former times, fighting was confined to the battlefield; the only sufferers were those engaged in the battle. But today, the spear and sword have been replaced by megabombs and devastating long-range missiles, so that killing and destruction take place on a horrendous scale. It is the entire human settlement which has now become the global arena of war. Even the air we breathe and the water we drink are left polluted in war’s aftermath.
Hence people in the West find Islam outdated and irrelevant precisely because of its militant interpretation. Demands for a reform in Islam are on the increase, as the ‘old’ version of Islam cannot apparently keep pace with the modern world.But, in reality, it is not reformation which is urgent, but revival. What is needed is to discard as superficial and erroneous the militant and political interpretation of Islam, and to adopt the original, ‘old’ version of Islam based on peace, mercy and the love of mankind.
The so-called Muslim Mujahideen have been exhorting their co-religionists to do battle all over the world. But the Qur’an says: ‘...and God calls to the home of peace’ (10:25). It is up to right-thinking people everywhere to disregard the Mujahideen call, and to start seeing and accepting Islam as it is truly represented by the Qur’an.
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AN EXPLANATION OF THE PERFECT NAMES AND ATTRIBUTES OF ALLAH

AN EXPLANATION OF THE PERFECT NAMES AND ATTRIBUTES OF ALLAH
"He is Allah, the Creator, the Originator, The Fashioner, to Him belong the most beautiful names: whatever is in the heavens and on earth, do declare His praises and glory. And He is the Exalted in Might, The Wise. (Quran 59:24)
"The most beautiful names belong to God: so call on Him by them;..." (7:180)
It is not possible to perfectly translate the names and attributes of Allah from their original Arabic into English. However, here are some fairly close explanations.
^= letter ain of arabic '= letter hamza of arabic
Allah
Allah, He who has the Godhood which is the power to create the entities.
Ar-Rahmaan
The Compassionate, The Beneficient, The One who has plenty of mercy for the believers and the blasphemers in this world and especially for the believers in the hereafter.
Ar-Raheem
The Merciful, The One who has plenty of mercy for the believers.
Al-Malik
The King, The Sovereign Lord, The One with the complete Dominion, the One Whose Dominion is clear from imperfection.
Al-Quddoos
The Holy, The One who is pure from any imperfection and clear from children and adversaries.
As-Salaam
The Source of Peace, The One who is free from every imperfection.
Al-Mu'min
Guardian of Faith, The One who witnessed for Himself that no one is God but Him. And He witnessed for His believers that they are truthful in their belief that no one is God but Him.
Al-Muhaimin
The Protector, The One who witnesses the saying and deeds of His creatures.
Al-^Azeez
The Mighty, The Strong, The Defeater who is not defeated.
Al-Jabbaar
The Compeller, The One that nothing happens in His Dominion except that which He willed.
Al-Mutakabbir
The Majestic, The One who is clear from the attributes of the creatures and from resembling them.
Al-Khaaliq
The Creator, The One who brings everything from non-existence to existence.
Al-Bari'
The Evolver, The Maker, The Creator who has the Power to turn the entities.
Al-Musawwir
The Fashioner, The One who forms His creatures in different pictures.
Al-Ghaffaar
The Great Forgiver, The Forgiver, The One who forgives the sins of His slaves time and time again.
Al-Qahhaar
The Subduer, The Dominant, The One who has the perfect Power and is not unable over anything.
Al-Wahhaab
The Bestower, The One who is Generous in giving plenty without any return. He is everything that benefits whether Halal or Haram.
Al-Razzaaq
The Sustainer, The Provider.
Al-Fattaah
The Opener, The Reliever, The Judge, The One who opens for His slaves the closed worldy and religious matters.
Al-^Aleem
The All-knowing, The Knowledgeable; The One nothing is absent from His knowledge.
Al-Qaabid
The Constricter, The Retainer, The Withholder, The One who constricts the sustenance by His wisdomand expands and widens it with His Generosity and Mercy.
Al-Baasit
The Expander, The Englarger, The One who constricts the sustenance by His wisdomand expands and widens it with His Generosity and Mercy.
Al-Khaafid
The Abaser, The One who lowers whoever He willed by His Destruction and raises whoever He willed by His Endowment.
Ar-Raafi^
The Exalter, The Elevator, The One who lowers whoever He willed by His Destruction and raises whoever He willed by His Endowment.
Al-Mu^iz
The Honorer, He gives esteem to whoever He willed, hence there is no one to degrade Him; And He degrades whoever He willed, hence there is no one to give Him esteem.
Al-Muthil
The Dishonorer, The Humiliator, He gives esteem to whoever He willed, hence there is no one to degrade Him; And He degrades whoever He willed, hence there is no one to give Him esteem.
As-Samee^
The All-Hearing, The Hearer, The One who Hears all things that are heard by His Eternal Hearing without an ear, instrument or organ.
Al-Baseer
The All-Seeing, The One who Sees all things that are seen by His Eternal Seeing without a pupil or any other instrument.
Al-Hakam
The Judge, He is the Ruler and His judgment is His Word.
Al-^Adl
The Just, The One who is entitled to do what He does.
Al-Lateef
The Subtle One, The Gracious, The One who is kind to His slaves and endows upon them.
Al-Khabeer
The Aware, The One who knows the truth of things.
Al-Haleem
The Forebearing, The Clement, The One who delays the punishment for those who deserve it and then He might forgive them.
Al-^Azeem
The Great One, The Mighty, The One deserving the attributes of Exaltment, Glory, Extolement,and Purity from all imperfection.
Al-Ghafoor
The All-Forgiving, The Forgiving, The One who forgives a lot.
Ash-Shakoor
The Grateful, The Appreciative, The One who gives a lot of reward for a little obedience.
Al-^Aliyy
The Most High, The Sublime, The One who is clear from the attributes of the creatures.
Al-Kabeer
The Most Great, The Great, The One who is greater than everything in status.
Al-Hafeez
The Preserver, The Protector, The One who protects whatever and whoever He willed to protect.
Al-Muqeet
The Maintainer, The Guardian, The Feeder, The Sustainer, The One who has the Power.
Al-Haseeb
The Reckoner, The One who gives the satisfaction.
Aj-Jaleel
The Sublime One, The Beneficent, The One who is attributed with greatness of Power and Glory of status.
Al-Kareem
The Generous One, The Bountiful, The Gracious, The One who is attributed with greatness of Power and Glory of status.
Ar-Raqeeb
The Watcher, The Watchful, The One that nothing is absent from Him. Hence it's meaning is related to the attribute of Knowledge.
Al-Mujeeb
The Responsive, The Hearkener, The One who answers the one in need if he asks Him and rescues the yearner if he calls upon Him.
Al-Wasi^
The Vast, The All-Embracing, The Knowledgeable.
Al-Hakeem
The Wise, The Judge of Judges, The One who is correct in His doings.
Al-Wadood
The Loving, The One who loves His believing slaves and His believing slaves love Him. His love to His slaves is His Will to be merciful to them and praise them:Hence it's meaning is related to the attributes of the Will and Kalam (His attribute with which He orders and forbids and spoke to Muhammad and Musa -peace be upon them- . It is not a sound nor a language nor a letter.).
Al-Majeed
The Most Glorious One, The Glorious, The One who is with perfect Power, High Status, Compassion, Generosity and Kindness.
Al-Ba^ith
The Reserrector, The Raiser (from death), The One who resurrects His slaves after death for reward and/or punishment.
Ash-Shaheed
The Witness, The One who nothing is absent from Him.
Al-Haqq
The Truth, The True, The One who truly exists.
Al-Wakeel
The Trustee, The One who gives the satisfaction and is relied upon.
Al-Qawiyy
The Most Strong, The Strong, The One with the complete Power.
Al-Mateen
The Firm One, The One with extreme Power which is un-interrupted and He does not get tired.
Al-Waliyy
The Protecting Friend, The Supporter.
Al-Hameed
The Praiseworthy, The praised One who deserves to be praised.
Al-Muhsee
The Counter, The Reckoner, The One who the count of things are known to him.
Al-Mubdi'
The Originator, The One who started the human being. That is, He created him.
Al-Mu^eed
The Reproducer, The One who brings back the creatures after death.
Al-Muhyi
The Restorer, The Giver of Life, The One who took out a living human from semen that does not have a soul. He gives life by giving the souls back to the worn out bodies on the resurrection day and He makes the hearts alive by the light of knowledge.
Al-Mumeet
The Creator of Death, The Destroyer, The One who renders the living dead.
Al-Hayy
The Alive, The One attributed with a life that is unlike our life and is not that of a combination of soul, flesh or blood.
Al-Qayyoom
The Self-Subsisting, The One who remains and does not end.
Al-Waajid
The Perceiver, The Finder, The Rich who is never poor. Al-Wajd is Richness.
Al-Waahid
The Unique, The One, The One without a partner.
Al-Ahad
The One.
As-Samad
The Eternal, The Independent, The Master who is relied upon in matters and reverted to in ones needs.
Al-Qaadir
The Able, The Capable, The One attributed with Power.
Al-Muqtadir
The Powerful, The Dominant, The One with the perfect Power that nothing is withheld from Him.
Al-Muqaddim
The Expediter, The Promoter, The One who puts things in their right places. He makes ahead what He wills and delays what He wills.
Al-Mu'akh-khir
The Delayer, the Retarder, The One who puts things in their right places. He makes ahead what He wills and delays what He wills.
Al-'Awwal
The First, The One whose Existence is without a beginning.
Al-'Akhir
The Last, The One whose Existence is without an end.
Az-Zaahir
The Manifest, The One that nothing is above Him and nothing is underneath Him, hence He exists without a place. He, The Exalted, His Existence is obvious by proofs and He is clear from the delusions of attributes of bodies.
Al-Baatin
The Hidden, The One that nothing is above Him and nothing is underneath Him, hence He exists without a place. He, The Exalted, His Existence is obvious by proofs and He is clear from the delusions of attributes of bodies.
Al-Walee
The Governor, The One who owns things and manages them.
Al-Muta^ali
The Most Exalted, The High Exalted, The One who is clear from the attributes of the creation.
Al-Barr
The Source of All Goodness, The Righteous, The One who is kind to His creatures, who covered them with His sustenance and specified whoever He willed among them by His support, protection, and special mercy.
At-Tawwaab
The Acceptor of Repentance, The Relenting, The One who grants repentance to whoever He willed among His creatures and accepts his repentance.
Al-Muntaqim
The Avenger, The One who victoriously prevails over His enemies and punishes them for their sins. It may mean the One who destroys them.
Al-^Afuww
The Pardoner, The Forgiver, The One with wide forgiveness.
Ar-Ra'uf
The Compassionate, The One with extreme Mercy. The Mercy of Allah is His will to endow upon whoever He willed among His creatures.
Malik Al-Mulk
The Eternal Owner of Sovereignty, The One who controls the Dominion and gives dominion to whoever He willed.
Thul-Jalali wal-Ikram
The Lord of Majesty and Bounty, The One who deserves to be Exalted and not denied.
Al-Muqsit
The Equitable, The One who is Just in His judgment.
Aj-Jaami^
The Gatherer, The One who gathers the creatures on a day that there is no doubt about, that is the Day of Judgment.
Al-Ghaniyy
The Self-Sufficient, The One who does not need the creation.
Al-Mughni
The Enricher, The One who satisfies the necessities of the creatures.
Al-Maani^
The Preventer, The Withholder.
Ad-Daarr
The Distresser, The One who makes harm reach to whoever He willed and benefit to whoever He willed.
An-Nafi^
The Propitious, The One who makes harm reach to whoever He willed and benefit to whoever He willed.
An-Noor
The Light, The One who guides.
Al-Haadi
The Guide, The One whom with His Guidance His belivers were guided, and with His Guidance the living beings have been guided to what is beneficial for them and protected from what is harmful to them.
Al-Badi^
The Incomparable, The One who created the creation and formed it without any preceding example.
Al-Baaqi
The Everlasting, The One that the state of non-existence is impossible for Him.
Al-Waarith
The Supreme Inheritor, The Heir, The One whose Existence remains.
Ar-Rasheed
The Guide to the Right Path, The One who guides.
As-Saboor
The Patient, The One who does not quickly punish the sinners.

"...There is nothing whatever like unto Him, and He is the One that hears and sees (all things). Qur'an [42:11] (Arabic transliteration: Laysa Kamithlihi Shayun Wa Huwa As-Sami' ul-Basir)
NOTE: I found many different versions of the 99 names. The above 99 are on a poster I have. Another list includes Al-Mu'tiy - The Bestower, The Giver and does not have Al-Ahad - The One. Another list did not have Al-Razzaaq -The Sustainer, The Provider but did have Al-Maajid The Noble, The One who is Majid.
Allah (subhanahu wa ta`ala)'s names are not limited to 99, which is a common misconception. There are a couple of evidences, one is the du`aa where one calls upon Allah by the names He (subhanahu wa ta`ala) has kept to Himself (obviously not taking these names since Allah has not revealed them to us); another is the fact that in the narrations of the famous ninety nine names hadith that do contain 99 names, the names are not consistent between narrations (for example, imam al-bayhaqi reports two versions of this hadith, with different 99 names in each). It is suggested by one commentator that the names were not explicitly stated by the rasul (sallallahu `alayhi wa sallam).

Non-Violence and Islam

Non-Violence and IslamMaulana Wahiduddin Khan
Non-violence should never be confused with inaction or passivity. Non-violence is action in the full sense of the word. Rather it is more forceful an action than that of violence. It is a fact that non-violent activism is more powerful and effective than violent activism.
Non-violent activism is not limited in its sphere. It is a course of action which may be followed in all matters.
Whenever individuals, groups or communities are faced with a problem, one way to solve it is by resorting to violence. The better way is to attempt to solve the problem by peaceful means, avoiding violence and confrontation. Peaceful means may take various forms. In fact, it is the nature of the problem which will determine which of these peaceful methods is applicable to the given situation.
Islam is a religion which teaches non-violence. According to the Qur’an, God does not love fasad, violence. What is meant here by fasad is clearly expressed in verse 205 of the second Surah. Basically, fasad is that action which results in disruption of the social system, causing huge losses in terms of lives and property.
Conversely, we can say with certainty that God loves non-violence. He abhors violent activity being indulged in human society, as a result of which people have to pay the price with their possessions and lives. This is supported by other statements in the Qur’an. For instance, we are told in the Qur’an that peace is one of God’s names (59:23). Those who seek to please God are assured by verse 5 of the sixteenth surah that they will be guided by Him to "the paths of peace." Paradise, which is the final destination of the society of God’s choice, is referred to in the Qur’an as "the home of peace" (89:30), etc.
The entire spirit of the Qur’an is in consonance with this concept. For instance, the Qur’an attaches great importance to patience. In fact, patience is set above all other Islamic virtues with the exceptional promise of reward beyond measure. (39:10)
Patience implies a peaceful response or reaction, whereas impatience implies a violent response. The word Sabr exactly expresses the notion of non-violence as it is understood in modern times. That patient action is non-violent action has been clearly expressed in the Qur’an. According to one tradition, the Prophet of Islam observed: God grants to rifq (gentleness) what he does not grant to unf (violence). (Sunan, Abu Dawood, 4/255)
The word rifq has been used in this hadith as an antithesis to unf. These terms convey exactly what is meant by violence and non-violence in present times. This hadith clearly indicates the superiority of the non-violent method.
God grants on non-violence what He does not grant to violence is no simple matter. It has very wide and deep implications. It embodies an eternal law of nature. By the very law of nature all bad things are associated with violence, while all good things are associated with non-violence.
Violent activities breed hatred in society, while non-violent activities elicit love. Violence is the way of destruction while non-violence is the way of construction. In an atmosphere of violence, it is enmity which flourishes, while in an atmosphere of non-violence, it is friendship which flourishes. The method of violence gives way to negative values while the method of non-violence is marked by positive values. The method of violence embroils people in problems, while the method of non-violence leads people to the exploiting of opportunities. In short, violence is death, non-violence is life.
Both the Qur’an and the hadith have attached great importance to jihad. What is jihad? Jihad means struggle, to struggle one’s utmost. It must be appreciated at the outset that this word is used for non-violent struggle as opposed to violent struggle. One clear proof of this is the verse of the Qur’an (25:52) which says: Perform jihad with this (i.e. the word of the Qur’an) most strenuously.
The Qur’an is not a sword or a gun. It is a book of ideology. In such a case performing jihad with the Qur’an would mean an ideological struggle to conquer peoples’ hearts and minds through Islam’s superior philosophy.
In the light of this verse of the Qur’an, jihad in actual fact is another name for peaceful activism or non-violent activism. Where qital is violent activism, jihad is non-violent activism.
Peaceful Beginning
When the Qur’an began to be revealed, the first verse of the revelation conveyed the injunction: ‘Read!’ (Iqra) (96:1). By perusing this verse we learn about the initiation of Islamic action. It begins from the point where there is hope of continuing the movement along peaceful lines, and not from that point where there are chances of its being marred by violence.
When the command of ‘Iqra’ was revealed, there were many options available in Mecca as starting points for a movement. For instance, one possible starting point was to launch a movement to purify the Kabah of the 360 idols installed in it. But, by pursuing such a course the Islamic movement would certainly have had to face a violent reaction from the Quraysh. An alternative starting point could have been an attempt to secure a seat in the Dar-al-Nadwa (Mecca’s parliament). At that time almost the whole of Arabia was under the direct or indirect influence of the Roman and Sasanid empires. If the freeing of Arabia from this influence had been made the starting point, this would also have been met with an immediate violent reaction on the part of the Quraysh.
Leaving aside these options, the path followed was that of reading the Qur’an, an activity that could be with certainty continued along peaceful lines: no violent reaction would ensue from engaging in such an activity.
The Prophet of Islam followed this principle throughout his life. His policy was that of adopting non-violent methods in preference to violent methods. It is this policy which was referred to by Aishah, the Prophet’s wife, in these words: Whenever the Prophet had to opt for one of two ways, he almost always opted for the easier one. (Fathul Bari 6/654)
What are the advantages of non-violent activism over violent activism? They are briefly stated as under:
According to the Qur’an there are two faculties in every human being which are mutually antipathetic. One is the ego, and the other is the conscience called respectively nafs ammara and nafs lawwama. (The Qur’an, 12:53; 75:26) What the violent method invariably does is to awaken the ego which necessarily results in a breakdown of social equilibrium. On the other hand, non-violent activism awakens the conscience. From this results an awakening in people of introspection and self-appraisal. And according to the Qur’an, the miraculous outcome of this is that "he who is your enemy will become your dearest friend." (41:34)
A great advantage of the non-violent method is that, by following it, no part of one’s time is wasted. The opportunities available in any given situation may then be exploited to the fullest extent—as happened after the no-war pact of Hudaybiya. This peace treaty enabled the energies of the believers to be utilized in peaceful constructive activities instead of being dissipated in a futile armed encounter. One great harm done by violent activism is the breaking of social traditions in the launching of militant movements. Conversely, the great benefit that accrues from non-violent activism is that it can be initiated and prolonged with no damage to tradition.
Generally speaking, attempts to improve or replace existing systems by violent activism are counter-productive. One coup d’état is often the signal for a series of coups and counter-coups, none of which benefit the common man. The truly desirable revolution is that which permits gradual and beneficial changes. And this can be achieved only on the basis of non-violence.
Success Through the Non-violence Method
All the great successes of the first phase of Islam as well as the succeeding periods were achieved by non-violent methods. Listed below are some examples of these successes.
Of the 23 year period of prophethood, the initial 13 years were spent by the Prophet in Mecca. The Prophet fully adopted the way of pacifism or non-violence during this time. There were many such issues in Mecca at that time which could have been the subject of clash and confrontation. But, sedulously avoiding all such issues, the Prophet of Islam strictly limited his sphere to peaceful propagation of the word of God. This resulted in Dawah work being performed in full force throughout this period. One of the great gains during these 13 years of dawah work was the entry into the Islamic fold of men of the highest moral caliber who were responsible for forming the history of Islam, for instance, Abu Bakr, Umar, Usman and Ali, etc.
In Mecca when the Quraysh leaders were set to wage war against the Prophet, even then, instead of opting for the way of reaction and retaliation, what the Prophet did was to secretly migrate to Medina.
Migration, by its very nature, was a clear example of non-violent activism. This peaceful strategy enabled the Prophet and his followers, about two hundred in number, to form a powerful center of Islam in Medina. Had they adopted the path of confrontation instead of peaceful migration, the history of Islam might have been buried right there in Mecca shortly after its inception.
After the emigration, his antagonists took the unilateral decision to wage war against him. Consequently such bloody encounters as those of Badr and Uhud took place. Then the Prophet made a 10-year peace treaty known in history as Sulh al-Hudaybiya, by accepting all the conditions of his opponents. This has been called a ‘clear victory’ in the Qur’an. It is this peace treaty, paving the way for peaceful constructive activities which ultimately made possible the conquest of Mecca and the whole of Arabia.
By the end of the pious caliphate, a bloody encounter took place between the Banu Hashim and the Banu Umayya. This stopped the advance of Islam for a period of ten years. What set this process in motion once again was the voluntary withdrawal of Hasan ibn Ali (d. 50 A.H.) from the battlefield. This was undeniably a practical form of non-violent activism. This peaceful move on the part of Hasan ibn Ali re-opened to Islam the locked doors of progress.
During the last days of the Abbasid caliphate Mongol tribes attacked the Muslim world and right from Samarkand to Aleppo destroyed the entire Muslim world. The history of Islam had apparently come to a standstill. At that moment the spirit of dawah work was born within the Muslims. As a result, the majority of the Mongols converted to Islam. And that miracle took place which has been described by an orientalist in these words: "The religion of Muslims has conquered where their arms had failed."
Islamic history took a crucial turn when, in the years succeeding the pious caliphate, rot had set in the system of the government, and the caliphate had turned into monarchy. At that juncture, many factors emerged which would result in clash and confrontation between the ruler and the ruled. But, following the guidance of the Prophet, the Muslims totally avoided political confrontation. This history beginning with the Umayyad caliphate, continued for several centuries. This was possible because the tabieen (companions of the Prophet’s companions) and their succeeding generations, consisting of traditionalists, jurists, ulema, Sufis and other great religious scholars, all scrupulously avoided any clash or confrontation with the rulers.
It was during this period that peaceful dawah work was started in various countries and the disciplines of hadith, fiqh and other Islamic sciences came into existence on a large scale after a long period of great ideological struggle. All the precious books which adorn our libraries, all the classical literature of Islam are the result of these peaceful activities.
For instance, the hadith as a source of shariah is second only to the Qur’an in Islam. These traditions now exist in the form of printed books. These books are so precious that, without them, it would not have been possible to develop Islam into a complete system as it exists today. During the Umayyads and Abbasids, when the political system had begun to deteriorate, where were these tens of thousands of traditions. All of them existed in the memory of the religious scholars, whose names are mentioned in the books as chains in the link of authorities who have handed this legacy down to us. Had they adopted the principle of violent activism and clashed with the ‘oppressive’ rulers, they would all have been slaughtered by them and the entire legacy of traditions instead of finding a place on the pages of books, would have been buried along with them in the graveyards. It is by the miracle of having adopted non-violence instead of violence that the precious sources of our traditions have survived in book form and, till today, adorn our libraries.
Political Revolt Unlawful
Despite the blatant perversion in the Muslim rulers after the pious caliphate, the Muslim ulema did not lead an insurrection against these corrupt individuals. For about a period of one thousand years they remained detached in this matter and continued to engage all their efforts in non-material fields. This was not a matter of accident but in obedience to the injunctions of the shariah.
As we know, in the books of hadith detailed traditions have been set down in the chapters titled ‘kitabul fitan’. The Prophet of Islam observed in plain words that in later times perversions would set in the rulers, they would become tyrannical and unjust, but that Muslims should not wield their swords against them. They should rather move to the mountains with their goats and camels.
By ‘goats and camels’ are meant the opportunities in non-political fields which exist, even when the political institutions are corrupted. This injunction given by the Prophet meant that the Muslims should avail of such opportunities by avoiding clash and confrontation in the political field. In short, by ignoring the political problem, they should avail of the non-political opportunities.
These injunctions of the Prophet of Islam were so clear that the Muslim ulema of later times formed a consensus to make insurrection against the rulers unlawful.
Imam An-Nawawi, commenting upon some traditions as set forth by Sahih Muslim (Kitab Al-Imarah) observes: "You should not come into conflict with the rulers in matters of their power. Even if you find them going against express Islamic injunctions, you should attempt to make the truth clear to them solely through words of wisdom and advice. So far as revolt and war against them in order to unseat them is concerned, that is totally unlawful according to the consensus of the ulema, even when the rulers are zalim and fasiq (tyrants and evil)." (Sahih Muslim, Bisharh An-Nawawi, 12/229)
This command of the Prophet, as clearly expressed above, was based on extremely important considerations. In actual fact, in the early phase of Islam (as well as in the later phase) dawah and reform works had to be performed, without which the history of Islam would not have been complete. If the ulema of the Muslim community had tried to pose a threat to the political institutions, certainly all this constructive work would have been left undone. That is why the Prophet of Islam expressly prohibited any clash with political institutions. This avoidance of strife guaranteed that non-political constructive work would continue to be performed without any break.
In every society there are always two systems side by side, one political and the other non-political. The latter is established through various non-political institutions. According to the scheme of Islam, non-political institutions established at the social level have always to remain stable. In this way there is a continuing endeavor—even when the political institutions have become corrupt, or keep changing—to keep Islam firmly established at the level of the non-political system.
The Command of War in Islam
It is a fact that certain verses in the Qur’an convey the command to do battle (qital) (22:39). What the special circumstances are which justify the issuance of and compliance with this command we learn from our study of the Qur’an.
The first point to be noted is that aggression or the launching of an offensive by the believers is not totally forbidden. It is permissible, but with certain provisos. We are clearly commanded in the Qur’an: Fight for the sake of God those that fight against you, but do not be aggressive. (2:190)
Only defensive war is permitted in Islam. Such a war is one in which aggression is committed by some other party so that the believers have to fight in self-defense. Initiating hostility is not permitted for Muslims. The Qur’an says: "They were the first to attack you." (9:13)
Furthermore, even in the case of the offensive being launched by an opposing group, the believers are not supposed to retaliate immediately. Rather in the beginning all efforts are to be made to avert war, and only when avoidance has become impossible is battle to be resorted to inevitably in defense.
3. According to the Qur’an there was one form of war which was time- bound strictly in relation to its purpose. This was to put an end to fitna ‘Fight against them until fitna is no more.’ (2:193) In this verse fitna signifies that coercive system which had reached the extremes of religious persecution. In ancient times this coercive political system prevailed all over the world. This absolutism had closed all the doors of progress, both spiritual and material. At that time God commanded the believers to break this coercive system in order to usher in freedom, so that all doors of spiritual and material progress might be opened to man.
This mission was undertaken and brought to a successful conclusion at the internal level within Arabia during the life of the Prophet. Later, during the pious caliphate, the Sasanid and Byzantine empires were dismantled with special divine succor. Consequently, intellectual oppression at the international level was replaced by intellectual freedom.
In this connection those traditions are worth noting which are enshrined in Sahih al-Bukhari. When, after the fourth caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib, political conflict ensued between Abdullah ibn Zubayr and the Umayyads, Abdullah ibn Umar, the seniormost companion of the Prophet held himself aloof from the battle. People approached him and, quoting the verse of qital-e-fitna, asked him why he was not joining in the battle. Abdullah ibn Umar replied that ‘fitna’ as mentioned in the Qur’an did not refer to political infighting, but rather to the religious coercive system, that had already been put to an end by them. (Fathul Bari, 8/60)
From this we learn that the war against fitna was a war of limited duration, meant to be engaged in only until its specific purpose had been served.
Invoking the Quranic exhortation to do battle against fitna in order to validate acts of war which had quite other aims was improper. This verse could be cited only if the same state of affairs as existed at the time of its revelation, were to prevail once again.
The biographers of the Prophet of Islam have put the number of Ghazwa (battle) at more than 80. This gives the impression that the Prophet of Islam in his 23-year prophetic career waged about four battles in a year. But this impression is entirely baseless. The truth is that the Prophet of Islam in his entire prophetic life, engaged in war only on three occasions. All the other incidents described as Ghazwa were in actual fact examples of avoidance of war and not instances of involvement in battle.
For instance, in the books of seerah, the incident of Al-Ahzab is called a Ghazwa (battle), whereas the truth is that on this occasion the armed tribes of Arabia, twelve thousand in number, reached the borders of Medina with all intentions of waging war, but the Prophet and his companions dug a deep trench between them, thus successfully preventing a battle from taking place. The same is the case with all the other incidents called Ghazwa. The opponents of the Prophet repeatedly tried to get him embroiled in war, but on all such occasions, he managed to resort to some such strategy as averted the war, thus defusing the situation.
There were only three instances of Muslims really entering the field of battle—Badr, Uhud and Hunayn. But the events tell us that on all these occasions, war had become inevitable, so that the Prophet was compelled to encounter the aggressors in self-defense. Furthermore, these battles lasted only for half a day, each beginning from noon and ending with the setting of the sun. Thus it would be proper to say that the Prophet in his entire life span had actively engaged in war for a total of a day and a half. That is to say, the Prophet had observed the principle of non-violence throughout his 23-year prophetic career, except for one and a half days.
The Islamic method, being based totally on the principle of non-violence, it is unlawful for believers to initiate hostilities. Except in cases where self-defense has become inevitable, the Qur’an in no circumstance gives permission for violence.
The Modern Age and Non-Violence
The greatest problem facing Islam today is, as I see it, that Muslims have almost totally forgotten the sunnah (Prophet’s way) of non-violence. In latter times when the Ottoman and Mughal empires disintegrated and problems like those besetting Palestine have had to be confronted by the faithful, Muslims all over the world have fallen a prey to negative reaction on a colossal scale; they have failed to remember that the policy of Islam is not that of violence but of non-violence. It is the result of this deviation, that despite almost a 100-years of bloody wars, Muslims have achieved no positive gain. Rather whatever they already had has been lost by them.
According to Imam Malik, later generations of this Ummah (Muslim community) settled matters at issue in the same way that earlier generations had done, i.e. non-violent methods. Similarly, Muslims of modern times must likewise resort only to non-violent methods. Just as no gain could accrue from violent methods earlier, no gain can accrue from violent methods today.
The state of affairs of Muslims in modern times resembles that which prevailed at the time of Hudaybiya. Today once again — only on a far larger scale — this hamiyat al-jahiliya prejudices prevailing in pre-Islamic Arabia (48:28) is being displayed by the other party. In the first phase of Islam its solution lay in Muslims sedulously avoiding an equivalent display of prejudice, and in holding firmly kalema at-taqwa they became entitled to the succor of God and were granted a clear victory (48:26).
At the time of the Hudaybiya peace treaty, the Quraysh, who had secured the leadership of Arabia, were bent on waging war. The Kaaba was in their possession. They had expelled the Prophet and his companions from their home town. They had taken possession of Muslims’ homes and other properties, and spared no effort in disseminating negative propaganda against Islam.
Given this state of affairs, there were only two options before the believers. One was to attempt to put an end to tyranny and launch an outright war on the other party in the name of securing their rights. The result of such a move would certainly have been further loss in terms of lives and property.
The second option was to remain patient in the face of immediate loss, be it political or material, and, in spite of the losses avail of whatever opportunities are already available. The Prophet of Islam and his companions chose this second course. The result was that in just a few years time the entire history of Arabia was altered for the better by an Islamic revolution.
The same state of affairs is widespread in modern times. Although today Muslims have suffered great losses, political and material, at the hands of other nations, there still exist a great number of opportunities only for self-betterment and for dawah work on a far larger scale. If availed of wisely, we can rewrite the history of Islam in magnificent terms.
The Manifestation of Religion
The aim of the revolution brought about by the Prophet and his companions in the seventh century is stated in the Qur’an to be izhar-e-deen. (Izhar in Arabic means dominance/ascendancy. Here izhar-e-deen signifies intellectual and ideological dominance, not political dominance. This means that in intellectual and ideological respects, God’s religion assumes ascendancy over all other ideologies and religions.)
Izhar-e-deen was not an incident of short duration, but an ongoing assertion of the eternal dominance of Islam. Its implication was that in the world of ideology, such a revolution would be brought about as would establish the supremacy of Islam forever. Its purpose was to unravel all the veils of superstition which clouded human judgement, and to lay bare the scientific proofs hidden in nature, so that the truth of monotheism could be brought to light for all humanity. As the Qur’an puts it, ‘They desire to extinguish the light of Allah with their mouths: but Allah seeks only to perfect His light, however much the infidels may abhor it.’ (9:32, 33)
Granting ideological ascendancy to God’s religion was a matter of considerable complexity, amounting to the writing of history afresh. For although God’s unassailable truth had always existed, it had become obscured by false and misguided ideas, because thinking, the arts and learning in general, had all become fettered by superstition and idolatry. This had led to a veil being thrown over true religion, which was the only proper vehicle for God’s truth. The coercive systems of the monarchies which prevailed all over the world at that time were responsible for perpetuating this state of affairs, for any intellectual freedom, particularly the freedom of religion, would have been a challenge to their supreme authority. Under such systems, there could be only such social development as suited individual rulers, and there could be no scientific development whatsoever.
Systems of governance which depended on religious persecution had, therefore, to be overthrown, so that a propitious atmosphere could be created for the performance of dawah of the true religion. This was carried into effect with resounding success by the Prophet and his companions, and all arguments were rallied in support of God’s true religion, so that all other religions would be divested of their former influence. This abolition of oppressive systems and the freeing of people’s minds from superstition naturally led to free scientific inquiry, a process which Islam has continued to foster over the centuries without interruption, and which has culminated in the unparalleled scientific achievements of the present day.
The technological advance which have been made possible by this scientific revolution have in turn provided Islam with an improved means of propagating Islam, namely modern communications. By making use of the media, those engaged in dawah work can spread the word of God much further and much faster than ever before. According to a hadith, a time was to come when God’s word would enter all the homes in the world. (Musnad, Ahmad). This was indirectly a prediction of the advent of our modern age of communications.
In ancient times, the study of religion could be done only as something sacred and as a matter of dogma. That is why established and unestablished religions had not, academically been distinguished from one another. In modern times, thanks to the influence of the scientific revolution, the study of religions can be done as objectively and as critically as any other matter which comes under scientific scrutiny. Such critical study has proved, purely academically, that historically there is only one reliable religion, and that is Islam. All other religions are lacking in this historical credibility. Prior to this, the dayees of Islam could resort only to traditional arguments in support of their faith, but it has become possible to measure up Islamic realities by the highest standards of human knowledge and to establish its authenticity by purely logical arguments. Indeed, in latter times, the sciences themselves have borne out the divine truths of Islam.
Yet, despite modern developments, our own times are constantly regarded as being fraught with problems for Islam. Muslims, lacking in understanding and awareness, forget that the modern age has never ceased to be the age of Islam. They fail to appreciate that Islam’s potential remains undiminished, and that it is for believers to convert that potential into an immediate reality. They should take into account the fact that, in the wake of the scientific revolution, which is itself the direct outcome of the Islamic revolution, it has become possible to begin a serious and beneficial dialogue between Islam and non-Islam, the result of which will necessarily be in favor of Islam. Now, this being so, the need of the hour is for Muslims to put an end unilaterally to all violent activities against madu (addressee) nations, so that a normal, amicable relationship may be allowed to grow between dayee and madu.
A Great Opportunity
1. Since direct argument cannot be applied to religious beliefs pertaining to the unseen world, these can be supported only by indirect or inferential argument. Educated people had therefore come to believe that religious realities belonged only to the domain of dogma, and that they were not academic or scientific realities. But after the breaking up of the atom the science of logic has undergone a change, and it has been accepted that inferential argument too, in its nature, is as valid and reliable as direct argument. It has subsequently become possible for religious realities to be established on an academic level, i.e. exactly on the same level as material or non-religious theories.
2. In ancient times when man observed the world, it appeared to him that in nature there existed things which were very different from one another. This observation of appearance produced the mentality of idolatry. People began to think that in view of the great diversity of things in existence, their Creator too would perforce take many and varied shapes. But scientific study has shown that this variety is only that of appearance. Otherwise, all things in nature are different expressions of the same matter. In this way shirk(idolatry) came to be seen as an intellectually untenable practice, while monotheism gained the solid support of logic.
3. According to a statement of the Qur’an, the signs of God lay hidden in the earth and the heavens. The study of science has made it manifest to all men that the universe is a great storehouse of divine arguments. "We will show them Our signs in all the regions of the earth and in their own souls, until they clearly see that this is the Truth." (41:53)
4. After the new discoveries of science, many such things have come to the knowledge of man as have rendered it possible to prove with new arguments those events which are of important religious significance. For instance, carbon 14 dating has made it possible to determine the exact age of the mummy of Ramses II, thereby providing scientific proof for the statement of the Qur’an that the body of Pharaoh was saved by God, so that it might become "a sign to all posterity." (10:92)
Islam in the Present Age
Now the question arises as to whether an Islam which teaches non-violence can be of relevance in the present age, and assume a superior position once again in new situations.
The answer is entirely in the positive. The truth is that Islam’s being a peaceful religion shows that it is an eternal religion. Had it been a religion of violence, it would not have been eternal. For in modern times, the way of violence has been totally rejected by contemporary thinking. Now only that system is worthy of consideration and acceptance the teachings of which are based on peace and non-violence.
Modern thinking, for example, has rejected communism. One of the major reasons was that communism had to be sustained by violence. And under no circumstances is violence acceptable to the modern mind. Nazism and Fascism too have been rejected on similar grounds. Modern man, therefore, disapproves of religious and non-religious extremism, because they lead man, willy nilly, to violence.
But Islam is a religion of nature. It has held violence as inadmissible from the outset. Islam has been an upholder of peace, not violence, from day one.
In the past, Islam played a great role in the development of humanity, as a result of which human history entered a new age of progress and development. The time has come today for Islam to play a great constructive role, leading human history once again into a new age of progress.
What is called scientific or technical progress is the result of the discovery of some of the great secrets of nature. But if nature and its mysteries have always existed in our world, why has there been such a long delay in their discovery? Why could not the scientific advancement of the last few hundred years have been made thousands of years ago?The reason was that in ancient times scientific inquiry was anathema to men of religion, to the point where religious persecution had become an inseparable obstacle to the progress of science. Since ancient times, religion and science (divine knowledge and human knowledge) were linked with one another. What Islam did was separate religion (which had become, in essence, a set of irrational beliefs) from scientific research and investigation. For instance, eclipses of the sun and moon had been linked with human destiny. The Prophet of Islam declared that eclipses had nothing to do with the lot of human beings. These were astronomical events, not events pertaining to the fate of mankind. (Fathul Bari, 2/611)
The incident of the pollination of dates is recorded in the books of hadith. The Prophet of Islam observed that in worldly matters such as these, "you should act according to your experience, as you know these matters better." (Sahih Muslim Bi Sharh An-Nawawi, 15/117)This meant delinking religion and science from one another. In this way scientific research acquired an atmosphere of freedom for its functioning. For the first time in human history science (human knowledge) could be developed freely without the intervention of religion. And advancing gradually, culminated in the attainment of the modern age.
But, today man is again facing an even greater problem. That is, despite the extraordinary progress made in the field of science and technology, human beings are confronted with the problem of not knowing the limit of freedom.
Modern man aspired to freedom as the highest good, but once having reached this goal, he was unable to set reasonable limits to freedom. In consequence, unrestrained freedom descended into anarchy and lawlessness. This is the actual cause of many of the problems which are emerging in modern times in western society. Now man requires an ideology which delimits his freedom, drawing the line between desirable and undesirable freedom. And it is only Islam which can provide him with such an ideology.
Now is the time for this ideology to be presented to man, who is ready and waiting to accept it.
After the fall of communism (1991), much of the world was and still is, faced with an ideological vacuum. This vacuum can be filled by Islam alone. In the present world the developed countries have become economic or military superpowers, but the place is vacant for an ideological superpower, and that, potentially belongs to Islam.There is only one obstacle in converting a great potential into a reality in favor of Islam. And that is the repeated recourse to violence by Muslim movements in modern times. Such action has presented Islam before the world in the guise of a violent religion. For this reason the man of today shies away from Islam. He fails to study Islam objectively. If this barrier could be removed and Islam once again brought before the world as a non-violent religion, or as a peaceful social system, then once again humanity would accept it, recognizing it to be the voice of its own nature.
Modern man is in need of a new religion or a new system, based on peace. It should be free from superstitious beliefs, and should provide the answers to deep psychological questions, on our flawed existence. Its principles should not clash with scientific realities, and it should be supported by a victorious history.
Today no religion but Islam can lay such positive claims to acceptance, for it is Islam and Islam alone which fulfills all these conditions. Individually, there are many men and women today who, after having studied Islam, have acknowledged these unique qualities in Islam. Some have acknowledged them in theory while others have gone ahead and accepted Islam in practice.
Dawah Activism
Islamic activism in respect of its method is based on non-violence and in respect of its target is based on dawah. Dawah, in fact, is another name for a peaceful struggle for the propagation of Islam. It would be true to say that Islamic activism in fact is dawah activism.
The task of dawah is no simple one. It enjoys the status of a key factor. If this task is fully performed, all other objectives will be automatically achieved. Here are certain references from the Qur’an in this connection.
Through dawah the believers receive God’s protection against the mischief of the opponents.
Through dawah even the direst of enemies turns into a dearest friend. (41:34)
Dawah proves Islam’s ideological superiority. And without doubt nothing is greater than the superiority of ideology. (10:32)
Through dawah a positive mentality is inculcated within the ummah. This is called ‘honest counsel’ in the Qur’an. (7:68)
The mission of dawah is performed by human beings but the conducive conditions for it are provided by God. Just as the farming is to be done by the farmer while the rains come from God. In modern times favorable conditions have been fully provided to man. Now the believers’ duty is to refrain from expending their energies in futile activities. They must exert their entire energy in dawah work. All the best results will ensue from this act.
The Prophet of Islam along with about two hundred of his companions left Mecca when the Meccan leaders had made it impossible for them to stay there. The Meccans had even decided to kill the Prophet. But the first speech the Prophet made on reaching Medina had no taste of bitterness, neither did it contain any mention of vengeance on or violence against the Quraysh.
On reaching Medina first priority was given to the task of entering into peace treaties with the tribes in and around Medina, for instance with the Banu Khuza‘a, etc. According to their pact neither would they fight against the Muslims nor would the Muslims fight against them. Most of the tribes in Arabia joined in these truce agreements.But the Quraysh did not desist from aggression, and even engaged in certain military forays against the Muslims. But, finally, in the sixth year of Hijrah, the Prophet succeeded in making a peace treaty with the Quraysh as well at a place called Hudaybiya, albeit on acceptance of all the conditions laid down by the Quraysh.
Muslims Displaced
It is an incontrovertible fact that Muslims have not been able to join the mainstream in modern times. At all places and in every department they are leading their lives as if driven into a corner. This is undoubtedly an extremely critical problem, for it has relegated Muslims to second class positions all over the world.
To me, the greatest reason for this is the violent attitude of the Muslims. Today’s Muslims are easily provoked and become violent at anything which is against their way of thinking, or even not to their liking. It is true that not all Muslims become involved in acts of violence. Yet all Muslims would be regarded involved in this matter. This is because that section, of Muslims—in fact, the majority—who are not personally involved, neither disown those members of their community who are engaged in violence, nor even condemn them. In such a case, according to the Islamic shariah itself if the involved Muslims are directly responsible, the uninvolved Muslims are also indirectly responsible.
It is Muslims’ religious and secular leaders who are actually responsible for this violent approach on the part of Muslims today. In modern times when Muslims have had to undergo the experience of defeat, almost all the religious, secular scholars (ulama) and intellectuals follow one single line, that of awakening the spirit of jihad (in the sense of qital) among Muslims. The entire Muslim world reverberates with such slogans as ‘Jihad is our way and Jihad is the only solution to our problems!’
The entire world has witnessed a great number of large and small movements in violent response to the problems faced by Muslims.If you go to Palestine, you will hear the youth singing a song no doubt taught to them by their elders:
Let’s make war, let’s make war,For war is the way to success.
In modern times the violent approach of our ulema, intellectuals, and leaders of movements, is the sole reason for the present violent mentality among Muslims all over the world. It is as a result of this mentality that, if anyone writes a book against Islam, Muslims are prepared to kill the writer. If any procession raises anti-Muslim slogans, Muslims start stoning the procession instead of killing the evil by observing silence, which, as Umar Faruq advocated, would be the best strategy in this case. If there is any monetary or territorial controversy with any nation, they immediately take up arms against it, rather than adopt a peaceful strategy to solve the problem.
This violent mentality of Muslims is responsible for having alienated them from their neighbors everywhere. Their conduct clearly shows that they no longer cherish the ideal of universal brotherhood. Everywhere they are looked upon with aversion and dread. One can even see notices on walls which say ‘Beware of Muslims’, instead of ‘Beware of dogs.’ And if these words are not inscribed on walls, they are certainly inscribed on the hearts and minds of the people. The resulting dissociation has left Muslims a backward group in modern times. Even in advanced countries like America they remain backward as a community in comparison with other immigrant groups.
The only way to alleviate the tragic plight of Muslims is to bring them back to non-violent Islam, by helping to understand that their violent version of Islam is not the true one.
As soon as Muslims take to the path of non-violent Islam, they will be able to become equal partners with other communities. They will have joined the universal mainstream, and will consequently be able to participate in all activities, in all institutions. People instead of dreading them, will welcome them. They will become a part of the universal brotherhood. Their issues will be looked upon with justice. Their equal partnership will be certain in all institutions ranging from the social to the educational.
Peaceful interaction will give Muslims the kind of intellectual stimulation and variety of experience which they must have if they are to tread the path of progress.
Interaction will also facilitate the task of dawah on a large scale. The natural result of this vast interaction of Muslims and non-Muslims will be that everywhere dialogue on Islam will be started, formally as well as informally. In modern times, because of the extremist and violent attitude of Muslims, serious dialogue between Islam and non-Islam has almost come to an end. Now when peaceful interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims takes place in a normal atmosphere, serious dialogue will ensue on its own. The beginning of serious dialogue between Islam and non-Islam is, without doubt, a very great success from the point of view of dawah.
The Qur’an describes Sulh Al-Hudaybiya, in the early period of Islam as a ‘clear victory’. It was a ‘clear victory’ in the sense that it established peace between the believers in tawhid and believers in shirk, thus making it possible for a serious dialogue to be held between the two on religious matters.
In modern times if Muslims abandon the path of violence and fully adopt the path of non-violence, this will be for Muslims like reviving the sunnah of Hudaybiya. And they will start receiving those great benefits which Islam and Muslims had gained after the event of Hudaybiya in the first phase.
Peace and Justice
One great problem for Muslims is that peace does not necessarily guarantee them justice. This has caused Muslims to become violent and to neglect opportunities for dawah. In modern times Muslims want a peace which brings them justice. But according to the law of nature, this kind of peace can never be achieved, that is why Muslims the world over are in a state of physical and mental unrest. Distressed in their minds, they have become violent in their thinking and in their actions.
The truth is that peace does not automatically produce justice. Peace in actual fact simply opens up opportunities for the achievement of justice. At the time of Hudaybiya the Prophet of Islam had not found justice. He had achieved peace but only by delinking it from justice. The Prophet had made this peace not to exact justice but to receive the opportunities. And great opportunities for dawah action did open up with the establishment of peace. The Prophet exploited these opportunities in full measure. Therefore, in just a few years’ time the Prophet not only ensured justice, but set Islam upon a much more solid footing.
The Muslims of the present day have to understand this secret of nature. Only then will it be possible for them first to find peace, then ultimately their desired goal of justice.
Conclusion
In October 1997, I met a 36-year old European, Leon Zippo Hayes, who was born in the city of Christchurch in New Zealand. After having studied Islam, he has changed his religion. His Islamic name is Khalilur Rahman. Passing through Muslim countries he is going to perform Hajj by land.
During the conversation he said that in modern times Muslims are engaged in bloody war at many places, at some places with others and at other places among themselves. This had led him (like many others) to conclude that perhaps Islam was a religion of violence. Later, he studied the Qur’an with the help of translations, and when he reached this verse in the Qur’an: ‘Whoever killed a human being should be looked upon as though he had killed all mankind (5:32),’ he said that he was so moved that he could not believe that it was in the Qur’an.This incident is broadly indicative of the thinking of non-Muslims on Islam. On seeing the actions of Muslims, people today find it hard to believe that Islam may be a religion of peace. But if Muslims stop engaging in violent activities and give people the opportunity to appreciate Islam in its original form, then certainly a great number of people would realise as they never had before that Islam was a peaceful religion and they would rush to it, saying that it was exactly the religion which their souls had been seeking all along.
(This paper was presented at the Symposium on Islam and Peace sponsored by Non-Violence International and The Mohammed Said Farsi Chair of Islamic Peace at the American University Washington D.C.)

HUMAN RIGHTS AND CULTURAL REFORM

HUMAN RIGHTS AND CULTURAL REFORM
IN CONTEMPORARY MUSLIM SOCIETY:
FROM HEGEMONIC DISCOURSE TO CROSS-CULTURAL DIALOGUE
Louay M. Safi
Cross-cultural dialogue is a recurring theme in international human rights literature. Some
human rights scholars underscore the need for a cross-cultural discourse for transmitting human
rights concerns and practices to non-Western societies, while others dismiss the call for engaging
non-Western cultures in a dialogue as counterproductive, since it can only lead to compromising
the universality of human rights.1
The purpose of this paper is to point out inconsistencies in the work of some leading
human rights scholars, involved in assessing human rights trends in the Middle East, who
advocate a cross-cultural approach to understanding human rights in non-Western cultures. I
argue that a close examination of what is referred to as a cross-cultural dialogue reveals
unmistakable elements of hegemonic discourse. It is quite evident that many human rights
scholars specializing in the study of Islam and the Middle East are not engaged in a two-way
communication with Islamic reformers, so that a better understanding of the context and
direction of Islamic reform may be attained, but rather in a hegemonic discourse whose effect
has been the overshadowing of a reformist discourse rooted in Islamic worldview.
I stress, however, that the distorted picture that comes out of this hegemonic discourse
does not stem out of any malicious intent to mislead, but rather is due to conceptual and
methodological reasons. Methodologically, the approach to studying human rights situations in
the Middle East is ahistorical and static, failing to detect actual developments in discourse and
practice, and unable hence to reveal the vigorous cultural reform currently underway in the
Muslim world. Conceptually, the distortion in the picture of the human rights debate in the
Middle East is due to the fact that observations are filtered through an absolute-universalistic
outlook, oblivious to the importance of the notions of culture, cultural variation, and cultural
dynamism on understanding human rights situations.
I further contend that while Islamic reform has a long way to go before it can ensure
individual liberty and equality for all, it has been moving slowly but consistently toward a vision
of an open, egalitarian, and tolerant society, and that it has already embraced international human
rights as defining principles of its vision of future society. I conclude by identifying the
preconditions for a genuine cross-cultural dialogue, and cautioning against attempts to subvert
human rights by employing human rights as a tool to justify imposition of external values and
choices, rather than an instrument for fighting coercion and imposition.
THE MAKING OF A HEGEMONIC DISCOURSE
The value of scholarship derives from its ability to bring meaning and enlightenment to the lives
of people, and to sharpen their understanding of the complex world in which they live. All
scholars realize that in order to bring about clear understanding, and to explain actions and
events in the complex world of humans, this world must be reduced into a managable set of
concepts. However, for a complex world to be reduced without distortion, scholars must take
special care to maintain balance among the various elements and componants that constitute it.
The failure to maintain balance, say by failing to reflect the size and significance of the various
forces locked in an intellectual or political struggle, is bound to bring about misunderstanding
rather than understanding, and to create an ugly image out of the most beautiful object of
understanding. Distortion is thus the most fatal act a scholar can commit.
The importance of human rights lies in the instrumental role they play to protect the
weak against the powerful, and to liberate the oppressed from their oppressors. It is widely
2
accepted by human rights scholars that the right to free speech is needed not to protect those
who celebrate the praise of the established power, but to make room for dissending views and
opinions. It is therefore embarrassing, even disheartening, to see human rights scholars siding
with oppressive regimes against their oppressed subjects by ignoring the actual abuses of the
former, while condemning the latter on the ground of an immaginary legal system they
supposedly intend to resuscitate as soon as they shack off their yokes, and obtain commanding
power.
Now, combine the above two scenarios in the discourse of human rights scholars who
are, wittingly or unwittingly, involved in distorting reality and using human rights to justify
cultural imperialism and penetration, and you end up with a potentially devistating discourse
entitled “Islam and human rights”. To be fair to the participants in this discourse, the debate
over the compatibility of Islam with human rights is still far from reaching the state of affairs
described above, and it is not difficult to see that there are few hopeful signs, which, if pursued
seriously, could shift the direction of the current debate towards more fruitful and promising
ends. Among the promising signs are the notion of cross-cultural dialogue on human rights, and
the notion of human rights based on international morality. But unless such notions are pursued
seriously, it is only a matter of time before we arrive at the dreadful scenario described above,
whereby scholarship and human rights become instruments for subjugation and control, and the
hope of a more caring world in which might is truly restrained by right is completely dashed.
Indeed, even at this relatively early stage of the discourse on Islam and human rights, one
can see that a strategic formation of an essentially hegemonic discourse is already in the making.
Central to any hegemonic discourse – or strategic discursive formation – is the recasting of the
subject of the study (in this case the attitudes and values of the adherents of Islam) in such a
manner that the strategic interests of the hegemonic culture is advanced vis-à-vis other cultures.
That is to say, the main effect of the formation of a hegemonic discourse is not understanding
the other, but justifying actions that aim at its subjugation or elimination. The other is presented
in such a negative image that the discourse recepients resign to the idea that it is utterly useless to
listen to it, or engage it in any meaningful dialogue.2 As I argue below, the negative presentation
of the other does not necessarily stem from a malicious intent to distort the facts. Rather,
distortion is often the outcome of the strategic positioning of the scholar in a particular culture,
which makes him or her more susceptible to the particular interests and historical experiences of
the social group to which he or she belongs, and the tendency to evaluate other cultures and
groups though notions and theories derived from these particular experiences and interests.
While there is no shortage of academic works that display a clear pattern of hegemonic
discourse, I have made a careful decision to exclude the works of scholars who have openly
advanced a prejudicial arguments,3 and to focus my analysis on examples taken from the writings
of moderate scholars who have presented relatively more balanced views on the subject. One
such an example can be found in Ann E. Mayer’s highly acclaimed work on Islam and human
rights. The main thesis in her work is that contemporary Islamic human rights schemes borrow
their substance from international human rights, but use shari’a to limit human rights
applications. Since historical shari’a discriminates, she argues, against women and non-Muslims,
limiting human rights by shari’a rules is tantamount to cancelling out the protections they intend
to ensure.
To demonstrate her thesis, Mayer examines four documents (the Iranian Constitution,
the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, al-Azhar’s model constitution of an Islamic
state, and the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights) and two works by Muslim traditionalists
(Mawdudi and Tabanda). Mayer discusses in detail the views of Muslim traditionalists, and
shows that they have wholeheartedly accepted historical shari’a, opposing any efforts to
reinterpret Islamic sources in ways that would lead to recognizing the right of all people —
regardless of their religious, gender, or ethnic distinctions — to equal freedom. She rightly
3
concludes that Islamic human rights schemes are effectively undermined when read through the
eyes of traditionalist spokesmen of Islam. By relying extensively on the traditionalist
interpretations of shari’a Mayer is, therefore, able to make a persuasive case to support her thesis.
Her persuasiveness is attained, however, at the expense of sacrificing clarity, and omitting crucial
facts. One such a crucial fact missing in Mayer’s work is the intense debate currently underway
between Islamic reformers and traditionalists on the relevance of pre-modern shari’a to modern
Islamic society. Indeed, Mayer herself realizes, in the context of critizing the use of shari’a for
defining the scope of individual freedom in the Iranian Constitution, the slippery nature of her
arguments, and poses an important question that goes into the heart of her contention:
Could it not be the case, one might ask, that the Islamic qualifications on rights might be
narrower than the ones permitted under international law, that these clauses could be
interpreted to mean that the government would have to produce much stronger
justifications for curbing human rights than it would under secular criteria? That is, one
might say that the assumption that broad Islamic qualifications on rights imply the
erosion of rights protection is only that — an assumption.4
Mayer immediately dismisses the doubts raised in the above question, insisting that “[a] lthough
in the abstract this question might seem justified, there are indications that warrant the
assumption that these qualifications are designed to dilute rights.”5 She goes on to cite three
grounds for her contention: (1) that the Iranian government excludes “[l]iberal Muslims with
strong commitments to human rights, like Mehdi Bazargan and Muslim clerks like Taleghani,
who believe that Islam protects individual rights and freedoms… .,”6 (2) that Middle Eastern
governments in general are “hostile to claims on behalf of individual liberties and the rights of
the citizens,”7 and (3) that there is “no developed tradition of Islamic human rights protections.”8
Yet it is not difficult to show, on a closer examination, that the grounds cited by Mayer
are fragile, and do not warrant her assumption. Thus the first point she advances supports the
contention I raised earlier that she is relying on traditionalist interpretations of shari’a while
obscuring the role of Islamic reformers in bringing about profound sociopolitical change to
Muslim society. For Mehdi Bazargan is himself a leading figure in the Islamic reform movement
that contributed to the demise of the authoritarian regime of the Shah. He was a member of the
committee that drafted the Iranian Constitution, and the first prime minister in post-revolution
Iran. He continued to work toward the creation of an open, egalitarian, and tolerant Islamic
society after he was pushed to the opposition by the traditionalist policies of the Ayatollahs until
his death. His efforts, and those of other Islamic reformers, gave rise to a vibrant reform
movement, opposing the conservative regime in Iran. The movement has recently succeeded in
dislodging the conservatives from the executive branch, bring more moderate government under
Khatami.
Similarly, to argue that Middle Eastern governments are “hostile to claims on behalf of
individual liberties” is to miss the point. For one needs only to remember that these regimes
embrace the ideologies of developmentalism — in their both nationalist and socialist forms —
which justify forced assimilation and cultural imposition, the very ideologies that gave rise to
Islamic reform movements. These governments are, by and large, avowedly antagonistic to
Islamic reform, and have rejected in the past all attempts to base social development on Islamic
values on ethos. The recent efforts on the part of some Muslim governments to incorporate
certain elements of historical shari’a into the law are aimed at gaining the support of traditionalist
jurists in their struggle against Islamic reformers.
Finally, Mayer’s contention that there is “no developed tradition of Islamic human rights
protections” is perplexing, and illustrative of a legalistic approach that lacks sensetivity to cultural
dynamism. For while it is true that historical shari’a does not support a full-fledged system of
human rights protection in modern society, Islamic reformers have been actively engaged, since
4
Afghani and Abduh, in efforts to reform traditional shari’a, as it is shown bellow. Still, it is
inaccurate to suggest that one cannot find principles, laws, and doctrines that can provide strong
foundation for Islamic human rights tradition. Indeed, as early as the second century of Islam
(eighth century) Muslim jurists have recognized the rights of non-Muslims to equal protection of
the law as far as their personal safety and property are concerned, as well as their right to full
religious freedom. Thus Muhammad bin Hassan al-Shaybani, the author of the most
authoritative classical work on non-Muslim rights, states in unequivocal terms that when
Muslims enter into a peace covenant with non-Muslims, “Muslims should not appropriate any of
their [the non-Muslims] houses and land, nor should they intrude into any of their dwellings.
Because they [have become] party to a covenant of peace, and because on the day of the [peace
of] Khaybar, the Prophet’s spokesman announced that none of the property of the covenanters is
permitted to them [to Muslims]. Also because they [non-Muslims] have accepted the peace
covenant so as they may enjoy their properties and rights on par with Muslims.”9 Similarly, al-
Shaybani concedes that Christians who have entered into a peace covenant with Muslims have
the right to practice their religion and maintain their Churches, and are entitled to trade freely in
wine and pork in their own towns, even though trade in, and consumption of, the two items is
prohibited to Muslims under shari’a rules.10
Evidently, Mayer’s assumption that shari’a rules are bound to effect excessive restrictions
on Islamic human rights schemes rests solely on reading these schemes through the eyes of the
traditionalists, while keeping the views of reform-minded Muslim scholars and activists in the
background. Indeed, leaving crucial facts and evidence out, while conveniently focusing on
radical and traditionalist elements of Islamic resurgence are characteristic of those human rights
scholars who have been quick to dismiss the profound Islamic reform currently underway in
Muslim societies, and to overlook its anti-traditionalist stance and liberal tendencies and ethos.
Similarly, scholars engaged in hegemonic discourse often water down the negative impact
of the self-serving foreign policies of major Western powers on cultural reform, and on the
maturation of human rights traditions. Thus Bassam Tibi dismisses the selective application of
human rights by Western powers as irrelevant to the debate on human rights practices in the
Middle East, and rejects the complaint of non-Western critics against selective application as
mere polemics.11 He goes further to dennounce non-Western opposition to Western hegemony
as unwarranted resistence “disguised as a claim to cultural authenticity”.12 Tibi does not stop
even once to ask: whence comes this hostility? Nor does he seem interested in finding out
whether the non-West is resisting the principles of human rights themselves, or only Western
interpretations of the mode and scope of their application. In fact Tibi seems to be completely
oblivious to the possibility that non-Western hostility might have to do with the support Western
powers lend to oppressive non-Western regimes, ruled by hated dictators. The hegemonic
nature of the intellectual discourse in which Tibi is engaged is so pervasive that it turns out that
even the notion of “cross-cultural consensus” he vigorously advocates does not involve a
dialogue among autonomous cultures engaged in rational persuasion, but a coercive discourse
that takes the form of monologue through which non-Western cultures are expected to learn the
manners and habits of a presumably morally superior West.13
THE PURPOSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
FROM AUTONOMY TO PATERNALISM
Can international human rights, which borrow their moral and intellectual strength from natural
rights tradition — a tradition that places great emphasis on human dignity and individual
autonomy — be used as an instrument to patronize and control other cultures? The answer to
this question can be found in an article written by a human rights scholar and Middle East
specialist, under the title “An Essay on Islamic Cultural Relativism in the Discourse of Human
5
Rights”.14 The article begins by pointing out certain oppressive practices of the Iranian Islamist
regime, and rightly identifies as the source of these practices the regime’s failure to recognize the
incompatibility of nation-state structures with the historically based Islamic legal system.
However, the author turns, in the second part of his article, to direct his moral indignation of the
Iranian regime at the practice of hijab (Islamic dress) by Muslim women. Rejecting the assertion
by Muslim women that their voluntarily adoption of the hijab signifies a self-expression of their
idea of Islamic decency, and an “affirmation of female autonomy and subjectivity”, Afshari
insists that the assertion is
illusory, more a symptom of a deeply rooted sociocultural malady than a sign of female
autonomy. It is illusory because the precondition that necessitates the adoption of the
hijab is set by the patriarchal reinvigoration of control and dominance, a new bay’a (oath
of allegiance) to male autonomy and subjectivity. It is illusory because the wearer’s
notions of propriety and modesty have internalized the androcentric norms of the
culture.15
The above argument is unmistakably paternalistic, even presumptuous, as it in effect accuses
Muslim women of false counsciousness. Because Muslim women have internalized the
“androcentric norms of the culture”, Afshari contends, their assertion of moral autonomy is an
empty claim. He further goes on to claim that in addition to being sub-consciously misguided,
Muslim women have another reason for wearing hijab, viz. to avoid “those sanctioned practices
that permit harassment of women in public, forcing them to comply with repressive norms and
rewarding them by according them a marked difference in the ways men treat women in
public”.16 The problem of this second argument is not that it has not been substantiated by
facts, but that it is totally contrary to actual practices in most Muslim societies that have
experienced Islamic resurgence. Afshari seems completely oblivious to the fact that in countries,
such as Syria in the early eighties, and Turkey today, the harassment is indeed practiced against
those who wear hijab, rather than those who choose otherwise.17
Afshari’s appeal to human rights as the ground to condemn those who voluntarily assert
their moral autonomy is troubling, not only because of its peculiar logic, but more so because it
draws its strength from the strategic positioning of its author within a hegemonic culture, and
from the strategic formation of a hegemonic discourse on which the author’s arguments feed.
Indeed, Afshari is clear as to the intellectual source that gives him the philosophical ground to
deny to Muslims any claims to cultural authenticity. The philosophical ground, he tells us, is
furnished by Rhoda Howard’s conception of human dignity.18 The question arises, therefore, as
to what conception of human rights and human dignity that drives someone to boldly deny to
Muslims the capacity of experiencing cultural authenticity, and to use international human rights
to prevent Muslim peoples from enjoying their moral autonomy?
Howard has consistantly defined dignity in such a way so as to denote submission to
“society values, customs, and norms”.19 Thus Howard’s conception of dignity – reads
community’s respect of the individual – stands at odd with the notion of human rights, and is no
more the ground for its justification. As she puts it: “Dignity frequently means acceptance of
social rules and norms: human rights implies challenge to precisely those norms. Dignity is often
associated with social constraint, whereas human rights are associated with autonomy and
freedom”.20 According to the above conception, human rights are not an expression of human
dignity, but its negation. No more does dignity rest on the subjective feeling of self-respect and
moral autonomy which motivate a person to demand that others respect his or her moral
choices, but has become completely dependent on the acknowledgement and respect of others.
Haward’s conception of human dignity, which places it at odd with the notion of
universal rights, strikes us as being disinguine. For the very notion of individual rights, advanced
6
first by natural rights scholars, is derived from the notion of human dignity. Kant thus argues
that human beings may claim dignity because they are the origin of all values. Unlike the objects
of the natural world which serve as means, and hence have a relative value (or price), human
beings are ends in themselves and have “an intrinsic value – that is, dignity”.21 Human dignity
derives from the fact that the human being is a “rational being who obeys no law other than that
which he [or she] at the same time enact himself [or herself]”.22 The rational volition individuals
possess, which impute relative values to all objects, and enacts universal laws to guide action, is
the source of dignity the moral person may claim. Human rights thus represent mutual
recognition among rational, and morally autonomous, human beings, and affirm the capacity
each of them has for moral self-determination.
Because human dignity denotes the moral autonomy of the individual, it can be best
observed not under favorable social circumstances, when the individual’s moral choices are
agreeable to the established power, but under adverse conditions, when the individual choose to
stick to his/her moral choices even at the peril of invoking the wrath of the power that be. A
person who refuses to change his testimony against corrupt authorities despite a serious threat to
his/her life, or a promise of substantial monetary reward, acts with dignity because he/she
choose to act pursuant to moral principles and universal laws, rather than succumbing to the
arbitrary will of others, or agreeing to sell themselves to the highest bidder. To say that human
dignity “is often associated with social constraint,” as Howard does, is to miss the point. The
respect society shows to those who abide by its moral code signifies reciprocity rather than dignity.
That is, people tend to reciprocate by respecting those who show respect to their moral choices,
and by showing contempt to those who disregard and violate their moral code. Of course
different moral systems demand different levels of conformity, and tolerate varying degrees of
dissent.
In homogenous societies ? such as a tribe or a religious community ? the moral
autonomy of the individual is subsumed in the moral autonomy of the group to which he/she
belongs, and hence his/her dignity lies in observing the tribal or communal norms, and their
refusal to deviate from them under pressure of an arbitrary will of a powerful individual or
group. Reciprocity here lies in ensuring the uniformity of action, and in treating with respect
those who respect the established norms, and with disdain those who ignore and violate
common morality. However, as soon as we move from a homogenous to heterogeneous
societies, where different moral communities live side by side, it becomes obvious that moral
differences have to be normalized and incorporated into the normative system that govern the
heterogeneous whole. Under such circumstances individual autonomy cannot be obtained
unless the moral autonomy of the group to which one belongs is ensured. Under heterogeneous
conditions, which are the conditions of postmodern society, human rights should aim at
protecting the moral autonomy of weaker moral groups against the possibility of forced moral
penetration by powerful groups. Similarly, reciprocity requires that each moral group recognize
that the other groups are entitled to the same moral autonomy they wish to enjoy, and that they
should not insist on imposing their own moral principles, even when they truly believe that these
principles are universally valid, as they would naturally dread that such imposition be directed
against them. The danger of Afshari’s argument that Muslim women who voluntarily choose to
express their notion of Islamic modesty are guilty of having unconsciously succumbed to “the
androcentric norms of the culture”, is that it can be easily turned against the self-expression of
women of any culture, including Western culture.
It should not be difficult, then, to see why the arguments of those who fail to recognize
the autonomy of non-Western moral communities, and who insist to use international human
rights to impose their moral vision on others run contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of
international human rights, enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).23
If human rights are meant to protect the human dignity and moral autonomy of individuals, one
7
cannot appeal to human rights to force Muslim women to abandon their voluntarily adopted
hijab under the pretext of false consciousness, as Afshari does.24 I am sure that the Turkish
generals and secular fundamentalists would be glad to adopt the argument of false consciousness
to justify their authoritarian and anti-democratic decree to prevent Muslim women from
adopting their dress style in accordance with their religious conviction, a decree that is
tantamount to religious persecution.
While it is quite legitimate for individuals to advocate their moral views so as to persuade
others of their value and their enriching effects on social life, it is contrary to dignity and justice
for one moral point of view to justify its legal enforcement on the ground of moral superiority.
In the absence of a universally acceptable moral authority, moral superiority can only be
established by moral persuasion. Such persuasion can take place through cross-cultural dialogue.
CULTURAL DYNAMISM AND
THE LOGIC OF ISLAMIC REFORM
The recent interest in studying the compatibility of Islam with human rights came as a result of
the increasing reassertiveness of Islamic beliefs and values in Muslim societies in the last three
decades, a phenomenon widely studied under the rubrics of Islamic resurgence, Islamic
revivalism, or Islamic fundamentalism. The reawakening of religious consciousness in Muslim
societies has been most visible in the political sphere, and has led to the increasing demand by
Islamist groups throughout the Muslim world for the reconstruction of the political and legal
systems so as to bring them into accord with the rules of Islamic law (Shari’a).
But while the various groups and individuals advocating the return of Islam as a source
of public norms, are united in advancing this common goal, they are disparately divided in their
varying visions as to what constitutes an Islamic public order. The diversity in orientations and
visions of Islamic advocates complicates the task of scholars and writers interested in examining
the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence and assessing its social impacts and political
ramifications. Faced with the overwhelming complexity of Islamic reassertiveness, some
scholars chose to ignore the differences that separate various Islamic groups, opting for a
simplistic approach in which the more radical views are taken as representative of Islamic
resurgence. This approach is more popular among international-relations specialists because, it
seems, it coincides with the-worst-scenario analysis favored by national security analysts.25 The
problem of this approach, though, is not only that it reinforces prejudices and distorts realities,
but it also prevents the development of effective foreign policy and undermines the ability of
American policy makers to influence developments in the Muslim world.
The bulk of scholars devoted to studying Islam and the Muslim world have managed,
however, to convey the complexity of Islamic resurgence by grouping the variety of views and
positions into a number of major trends. A wide range of terms have been used by various
authors. The classification list includes such terms as traditionalists, radicals, fundamentalists,
modernists, moderates, liberals, etc.26 Still, the picture which emerges out of an honest and
faithful efforts to depict reality at a specific historical moment can be as misleading and deceptive
as the picture of an acrobat taken few moments after hitting a springboard. The acrobat appears
forever suspended in the air. A person unfamiliar with the gravity force, say a citizen of an
eternal spaceship, would fail to realize that what he observes is a rare moment in the life of
human beings; even a person familiar with the law of gravity would be at loss to determine
whether the framed acrobat is moving upward or downward. Determining the dynamism and
direction of cultural reform in Muslim society, and the positioning of Islamic forces in the course
of societal change, is essential for understanding whether an Islamic political and legal reform is
compatible with human rights.
8
Unfortunately, most of what has been written by human rights scholars on Islam’s
compatibility with human rights overlooks the question of cultural dynamism and
reform direction. Thus we find that an insightful and penetrating work as Mayer’s Islam and
Human Rights succeeds only in revealing the tension over the issues of political reform and
human rights, but not its direction. Her conclusion, therefore, appears ambivalent, if not
perplexing. “[T]he diluted rights in Islamic human rights schemes examined here,” she argues,
“should not be ascribed to peculiar features of Islam or its inherent incompatibility with human
rights.”27 Islam seems to be the source of both liberation and restriction, of both reformation
and stagnation. The question thus arises as to where does Islam stand in the context of cultural
change?
To begin with, we should recognize that the drive for Islamic reform has intensified as a
result of the realization by Muslim intellectuals that developmentalism ideologies, advocated by
Muslim ruling elites, have not led to any meaningful political or social progress in Muslim
societies, but have instead resulted in the entrenchment in power of a self-serving ruling class
whose main goal is to maintain a lavish lifestyle. In post-colonial Muslim societies, ruling elites
have worked hard for, and succeeded in, creating for themselves and their cronies islands of
plenty in the midst of oceans of poverty. Many Muslim intellectuals, alienated by the highhanded
strategies of developmentalism, became convinced that the only viable political and legal
reform is one rooted in the moral commitments of the Muslim community.
Since its inception in the middle of the nineteenth century, Islamic reform movement has
rejected the traditionalist interpretations of Islam, and embarked on an ambitious reform project,
aiming at relating Islamic beliefs and values to modern life.28 The works of Afghani, Abduh, and
Redah ? the founders of what has been termed the reform school — present us with an
unmistakably egalitarian and liberal discourse, emphasizing openness and tolerance. Early
reformists rejected the anti-intellectual approach of traditionalist jurists, and advocated a rational
and critical reading of the works of classical Muslims. They rejected, for instance, the restrictive
role assigned by traditionalist jurists to women, emphasizing the importance of women’s
education and social participation. Indeed, as early as the 1930, Muhammed Rashid Ridah not
only did advocate the right of women to education and social participation, but also their right to
political participation.29 Similarly, al-Kawakibi attributed cultural decline of Muslim society to
denial to women the right to education, and stressed the importance of their public involvement
for their ability to provide proper guidance and sound upbringing for children.30
While reformist scholars were, and continue even today to be, outnumbered by their
traditionalist counterparts, they have exerted a profound and far-reaching influence on
contemporary society. Their impact can be seen in the increasingly more open views adopted by
leading figures within the traditionalist schools. Several influential and widely respected jurists
within traditionalist circles are on record in supporting democracy, human rights, including the
right of women to compete equally with men for public office.31 The views they express today,
and teach in public, and in shari’a departments of traditional Islamic colleges, would have been
sufficient for them to be branded as heretics just a century ago. Leading scholars of the Azhar
University, such as Muhammad Abu Zahra, Mahmoud Shaltoot, Muhammad al-Ghazali, and
Yusuf al-Qardawi, have been emphasizing equality between men and women, and between
Muslims and non-Muslims.
The views of reformers continue to mature in the direction of recognizing human dignity
and reciprocity in society. Most recently, Fahmi Huwaydi, a leading journalist in the Arab
World and respected Muslim reformist, addressed the question of equality between Muslims and
non-Muslims in a book entitled Muwatinun La Dhimiyun (citizens not dhimis). Huwaydi rejected
the dhimmi classification of non-Muslims as a historically relevant concept, and demonstrated, by
referring to Islamic sources, that non-Muslims in a Muslim political order enjoy full citizenship
rights on par with Muslims.32 The views advanced by Huwaydi is supported by the views of the
9
founder and leader of the main Islamic opposition in Tunisia who stresses that non-Muslims
enjoy equal citizenship with Muslim majority.33 Al-Ghanoushi also advocates the right of women
to participate on equal footing with men in public life. “There is nothing in Islam,” he writes,
“that justifies the exclusion of half of the Muslim society from participating and acting in the
public sphere. In fact, to do this is to do injustice to Islam and its community in the first place,
and to women [afterward].”34 Similar arguments for gender equality can be seen in the writings
of leading Shi’i jurists including Murtada Mutahiri, Muhammad Khatami, and Muhammad Mahdi
Shamsuddin.35
Given the continuous expansion and maturation of Islamic reformist views, focusing on
the views of the traditionalists, or on “middle-ground positions” is bound to distort the reality of
cultural reform in the Muslim society, and obscure the direction and dynamism of social change.
To doubt the potential of Islamic reform ? despite the overwhelming evidence of gradual
change of views toward a more liberal and egalitarian position advocated by reformists ?
because of the shortcomings of current reality is tantamount to doubting the liberating ethos of
the declaration of independence at the time of its promulgation because the American society did
not include women and blacks in the notion of “the people”. It took almost two centuries, and a
lot of struggle on the part of countless individuals who strongly believed in human dignity, to
bring these ethos to bear on the reality of social practices.
Again, despite the breathtaking cultural changes that took place in the twentieth century
Muslim societies, we still find scholars who want to convince us that there is such a thing as a
never-changing “Islamic culture”. Thus Tibi is able to make sweeping generalizations on Islam
and Muslim cultures; he writes:
If Muslims are to embrace international human rights law standards full-heartedly, they
need to achieve cultural-religious reforms in Islam ? not as faith but as a cultural and
legal system. In fact, Islam is a distinct cultural system in which the collective, not the
individual, lies at the center of the respective world view. The concept of human rights,
as Mayer rightfully stresses, is “individualistic” in the sense “that it generally expresses
claims of a part against the whole.” The part pointed out by Mayer is the individual who
lives in a civil society and the whole is the state as an overall political structure. Islam
makes no such distinction. In Islamic doctrine, the individual is considered a limb of a
collectivety, which is the umma/community of believers. Furthermore, rights are
entitlements and are different from duties. In Islam, Muslims, as believers, have
duties/fara’id vis-à-vis the community/umma, but no individual rights in the sense of
entitlements.
We are told in one breath that (1) Muslims are in need for cultural-religious reform, (2) Islam is
not a set of values and beliefs that ? like other religions ? give rise to various cultural forms,
but a “distinct cultural system,” and (3) Muslims have only duties towards the community, but
“no individual rights in the sense of entitlements.”
Tibi is not the first to argue that the emphasis in Islam is on duty rather than rights.
Donnelly advances similar arguments when he contends that, “Muslims are regularly and
forcefully enjoined to treat their fellow men with respect and dignity, but the bases for these
injunctions are divine commands that establish only duties, not human rights.”36 Yet these
assertions only reflect the lack of awareness, and possibily access, to the hundreds of voluminous
works in Islamic law which elaborate various rights, and judicial procedures for protecting those
rights, in the historical Muslim society. Suffice it here to give one example from the work of the
classical Muslim jurist al-Mawardi (d. 450 A.H./1086 A..C.). Recognizing people’s right to form
their own views, and to disagree with the prevailing views and dominant social and political
beliefs, he stresses that “if a group of Muslims rebelled by disagreeing with the views of the
community, and forged their own ideology, they are to be left alone and should not be fought,
10
and the rules of justice should be applied to them in accordance with their rights and
obligations.”37 Further, Muslims were able always resort to the numerous courts of law
established to enforce the rules of law in the areas of family, commercial, and criminal laws.
They were also able to appeal to a high court, the court of mazalim, whenever they were not
satisfied with ordinary courts rulings, or their rights were violated by governors or public
officials.38
Tibi’s statement that “Muslims … have duties … but not rights in the sense of
entitlement” is a true description of contemporary Muslim society, but not “Islamic culture”
throughout Muslim history. Contemporary Muslims do not enjoy rights not because these rights
are not on the books, but very often because they are ruled by authoritarian regimes and police
states that have very little respect to the idea of the rule of law. The “Islamic culture” in which
the individual is lost in the crowd of the collectivity is that of authoritarian Muslim regimes who
have entered into an unholy alliance with contemporary Islamic traditionalists against Muslim
reformers. Authoritarian Muslim rulers have found it more convenient to cooperate with
traditionalist jurists, whose agenda does not include such items as political participation, or
constitutional and legal reforms, in their fight against reform ideas and their advocates.
UNIVERSALISM AND THE IMPERATIVE
OF CULTURAL MEDIATION
I have argued so far against a static and ahistorical approach to understanding the Islamic
position on international human rights adopted by many human rights scholars critical of views
held by Islamic traditionalists. I have maintained that such an approach inevitably distorts
reality, since it fails to uncover the dynamism and direction of cultural reform currently
underway in Muslim society. My contention is not that Muslim cultures have already achieved
the desired political and legal reforms, or that they have already brought about effective
protection of individual rights and social justice. For from it. I rather contend that Islamic
reform has been a positive force in liberating Muslim consciousness from both the crushing and
oppressive ideologies of developmentalism, and the limiting practices of Islamic traditionalism.
I turn in this section to explore the relationship between moral universalism and cultural
relativism, and to underscore the need for, even the imperative of, cultural mediation of any
meaningful legal reform. The argument in this section paves the way for introducing, in the
subsequent section, a slightly modified approach to cross-cultural dialogue.
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 by the UN
General Assembly, and the subsequent empowerment of the UN Human Rights Commission to
monitor and ensure compliance of state members in 1976, the question of the universality of
international human rights has been hotly debated. Two main positions can be clearly
distinguished: absolute universalism and absolute relativism. The former holds that culture is
irrelevant to the moral validity of human rights, while the latter insists that culture is the only
source of moral validity.39 Both positions fail to capture the full scope of the intercourse
between culture and universal values, and both have been used to advance self-serving interests.
Absolute (or radical) cultural relativism cannot be theoretically maintained, given the fact
that one can hardly find today a society which still maintains a homogenous culture. Besides,
considering the dynamic nature of culture no community can claim that the cultural tradition it
espouses is either eternally static, or is not involved in a process of cultural exchange with
outside cultures. Absolute cultural relativism is often advanced by authoritarian regimes to shut
off external criticism of the excessive use of power to silencing internal opposition. Absolute
moral universalism, on the other hand, is oblivious to the fact that moral values and legal
systems are the outcome of the rationalization of a specific charismatic vision or worldview.40
Practically, radical universalism could be turned into an instrument in the hands of hegemonic
11
cultures, and could be used for imposing the morality of one culture on another, as Donnelly
explains:
The dangers of the moral imperialism implied by radical universalism hardly need be
emphasized. Radical universalism is subject to other moral objections as well. Moral
rules, including human rights, function within a moral community. Radical universalism
requires a rigid hierarchical ordering of the multiple moral communities to which
individuals and groups belong. In order to preserve complete universality for human
rights, the radical universalist must give absolute priority to the demands of the
cosmopolitan moral community over all other (“lower”) moral communities.41
The radicalism of the two positions discussed above can be avoided by recognizing that for legal
reform to succeed, it must coincide with cultural reform. That is, one must recognize that
culture is the only mediating milieu for restructuring individual and social consciousness so as to
make them receptive to, and supportive of, international human rights. Yet even when cultural
reform results in acknowledging the universal validity of human rights, a reasonable degree of
cultural relativism must be allowed so the universal principles are interpreted from within the
specific socio-political context of society, and are brought to bear on the particular
circumstances of the various communities.42 An absolute universalism which ignores the
essential role played by culture for the moral development of the individual suffers from
“normative blindness” and is detrimental for both the dominant cosmopolitan culture, and the
indigenous cultures it intends to reform. The devastating effects of the experimentations
undertaken in Australia, Canada, and the United States to assimilate the aborigines illustrate the
impossibility of achieving moral development apart from the cultural tradition to which an
individual belong. They also illustrate the arrogance of the developmentalist outlook which
equates moral superiority with economic and technological advancement.
The devastating consequences of the “normative blindness” of absolute universalism
advocated by numerous human rights scholars is not limited to non-Western traditions, but
extend to the tradition of modernity itself. That is, by attempting to globalize Western
modernism in the name of international human rights, the West runs the risk of preventing, or at
least delaying, the development of alternative cultural forms which could enrich the culture of
modernity itself, and help it overcome some of the acute problems it currently confronts,
including the problem of “normative blindness”. It seems, though, that for the latter problem to
be overcome, a major reform in the dominant Western schools of jurisprudence is needed. As
Richard Falk notes, neither in positivist nor in naturalist jurisprudence “does culture enter into
the delibrative process of interpreting the meaning, justifying the applicability, and working for
the implementation of human rights.”43
A cultural reform aiming at liberating the individual from traditionalist interpretations of
Islam is already underway, as noted earlier. Reformers are appealing to the values and ethos
embodied in the Islamic sources to restore the moral autonomy of the individual, and to develop
an egalitarian political culture. The reform is therefore Islamic in nature and intent, and cannot
be otherwise. All reform movements that have brought about profound cultural reform have
been religious. The essentially secularist and individualistic modern West owes its genesis, as
Weber reminded us in his Protestant Ethic, to the Religious Reformation that took place in the
Occident at the dawn of the modern West. The Orient should be allowed to undertake its own
reformation, which would inevitably result in the reorientation and rationalization of the
religious values and beliefs of the people of the orient, and must hence take the form of a
Confucian, Hindu, or Islamic Reformation.
Islam is a religion which has historically given rise to a variety of cultural forms. Like all
divine revelations, it emphasizes individual responsibility, and admonish its followers to adhere
to its moral code even if that would dismay the larger society to which they belong. While it
12
values social cooperation, it by no means places the collectivity above the individual.
Historically, Islam has given rise to unmistakably individualistic forms of philosophical, literary,
and artistic expressions. It has in the past inspired individual creativity that can be seen in the
work of eminent figures, such as al-Farabi, Averros, Avesina, and Ibn Khadun, to cite just a few
names well known for their contribution to Western scholarship. What is described as collective
orientation of the “Islamic Culture”, is a relatively new phenomenon in Muslim society, resulting
from the rational and moral decline of Muslims in the last two centuries, and effected by the
ascendancy in the post-colonial era of authoritarian regimes, demanding total individual
conformity in the name of developmentalist ideologies.
Despite a hightened interest in the notion of cross-cultural dialogue, there are very few
Western scholars who are engaged in a real dialogue with the advocates of Islamic reform.
There are many reasons for this, including the legalistic orientation of the two dominant schools
of legal jurisprudence in the West, and the defensive and apologetic approach of Islamic
traditionalism. But a true and meaningful dialogue is a must if human rights scholars, who are
strategically based in the West, were to have positive influence on the growth and maturation of
human rights reform in Muslim societies. It might be worthwhile to quote in this regard the
insightful words made by Leonard Binder little over a decade ago:
It may nevertheless be questioned whether any sort of exchange between Western
scholarship and the current Islamic movement is actually taking place, since the
development specialists seem to be talking to one another while the leading exponents of
the Islamic revival have decided to break off the dialogue. In point of fact, the dialogue
has not yet been broken off, and most of the present work is devoted to an analysis and
critique of some of the more interesting texts in which this cultural conversation is still
being pursued. This is not a completely open and reciprocal form of discursive
interaction, if only because Western intellectuals read very little of what Muslim
intellectuals write. Still, insofar as these [Muslim] thinkers explore Western ideas and
confront them with the hegemonic forms of Muslim thought, they carry out the dialogue
in their own works. I believe that the further strengthening of Islamic liberalism and the
possibility for the emergence of liberal regimes in the Middle East is directly linked to
the invigoration and wider diffusion of this dialogue.44
The words of Binder are as true today as they were little over a decade ago when he uttered
them. Still, it might not be too late for the advocates of Western universalism to abandon their
radical universalist position, which has ironically strengthened the radical reletivist position taken
by Muslim traditionalists, and to embark on a meaningful dialogue with Muslim reformers.
However, for a meaningful cross-cultural dialogue to take place, a number of conditions must be
observed; the elaboration of these conditions is the main concern of the next section.
PRECONDITIONS OF A TRUE
CROSS-CULTURAL DIALOGUE
Proponents of absolute universalism premise their arguments on either of the following two
presuppositions: (1) that the notion of culture ? i.e. a normative system supported by a set of
values and beliefs commonly accepted by a group of people ? is irrelevant to the debate on the
meaning and desirability of human rights, or (2) that human rights are compatible with a set of
moral values commonly shared by all cultures. I argue in this section that the first premise is
erroneous, and contend that for the common values to be universally valid, a non-hegemonic
cross-cultural dialogue must take place among representatives of various moral communities.
Scholars who deny the relevance of culture to the human rights debate usually favor a
unilinear view of history that equates moral with technical superiority. According to this view,
13
human cultures form a continuum in which primitive cultures represent one extreme while
modern culture represents the other. Primitive cultures are seen to be lacking not only in
technology, but in morality as well. Primitive cultures are described as barbaric and savage, while
modern culture is seen as refined and civilized. History, from a unilinear viewpoint, is nothing
but the movement from the primitive to the modern which forms the end of history.45 The
logical conclusion of the conception of history as modernization is that modern culture is the
measure of all cultures. The problem with this conception, though, is that it fails to account for
important historical events. The unilinear conception of history fails, for instance, to explain
why the European culture was more vibrant and developed ? politically, philosophically, and
artistically ? during the Roman civilization than in medieval times. From the modernization
perspective, culture is not relevant to the debate on human rights because there is nothing for
modern culture to learn from other cultures. Modern culture should set the standards for both
moral and technical action, and them pass then on to less developed cultures.
This is in essence the conclusion of a leading advocate of radical universalism in a
chapter published as part of an edited book entitled Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A
Quest for Consensus. Taking exception to the idea of a cross-cultural consensus on human rights,
she writes:
In this chapter I have argued against the enterprise of surveying world cultures and
religions in order to establish consensus on human rights that would answer charges that
such are a Western Creation.
To look for an anthropologically based consensus on the content of human
rights is to miss the point. There may be aspects of agreement worth noting among
what many societies take to be fundamental to a life of dignity and what the modern
notion of human rights includes as its content. The concept of human rights is not
universal in origin, however; and it cannot be located in most societies.46
Granted that an elaborate set of rights, purporting to protect the individual against an excessive
or arbitrary use of power by the state, was first articulated by the modern West, one should not
dismiss cross-cultural consensus as irrelevant. For even if we were to assume that the West
could learn nothing from non-Western cultures, a cross-cultural dialogue would still be needed
to understand the implications of applying a set of extremely abstract rights in various sociopolitical
milieus. Such an understanding should help expand the margin of tolerance for cultural
differences, and the appreciation of the complexity of cultural reform and the need to allow this
process to run its natural course.47
Other proponents of absolute universalism concede that human rights is a cultural
concept, and acknowledge the need for a cross-cultural basis for the claim of universal validity.
One interesting proposal has been advanced by Bassam Tibi in the form of international
morality to be “shared by all civilizations.”48 Noting Huntington’s warning against an impending
“clash of civilizations”, Tibi underscores the vitality of international morality for binding the
various “civilizations” in a peaceful pact. He rightly points out that “human rights cannot be
established internationally on the basis of overall universalism but rather on such cross-cultural
foundations for a universal morality.”49 He further emphasizes the importance of “unbiased
cultural dialogue and inter-cultural communication,” freed from the limiting concerns of foreign
policy and national interests.50 It turns out, however, that the cross-cultural dialogue he
envisaged does not involve a true cross-cultural exchange, but rather a one-sided intellectual
exercise that aims at addressing the question of “what ought to be done to make Muslims speak
the language of human rights in their own tongue?”51
It is obvious that an absolute universalistic stance is incompatible with “unbiased cultural
dialogue,” even when the proponents of such a stance truly desire this dialogue. A coercive
discourse in which the proponents of one of the contending points of view feel justified by their
14
strategic positioning to dictate on others their own morality cannot be called a cross-cultural
dialogue, but rather a hegemonic discourse. A true and meaningful dialogue requires that the
parties involved be truly interested in understanding the opposing views, and are involved in “a
completely open and reciprocal form of discursive interaction.”52 The transition from a
hegemonic discourse to a cross-cultural dialogue requires, therefore, more than the manipulation
of linguistic usage. The transition requires change in attitude and approach, from one that relies
on power relationship to one that depends on rational interaction, or, to use Habermasian
categories, a transition from a strategic speech act whose aim is to advance the interests of the
powerful actor, to communicative speech act, whose goal is to influence the actions of others by
appealing to their rational sense.53 Put more precisely, for the transition from a hegemonic
discourse, denoting a strategic interaction, to a true cross-cultural dialogue, signifying a
communicative interaction, to take place, three preconditions must be met: (1) the universalism
of human rights must be established objectively, (2) the moral autonomy of the various national
and cultural communities that form the world community must be recognized and respected,
and (3) the self-righteous claim by any cultural group of the superiority of its moral system must
be rejected.
Arguments for the universality of human rights invoke, more often than not, the
subjective rather than the objective dimension of universalism. Subjective universalism is
monological because it takes “the form of a hypothetical process of argumentation occurring in
the individual mind.”54 Subjective universalization process follows the pattern set by Kant in the
form of the Categorical Imperative: “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same
time will that it should become a universal law.”55 From a Kantian point of view, a rule can be
universal if it passes the test of the reciprocity principle, viz. if the person who adopts the rule as a
maxim for his/her action is willing to be treated by others according to the same rule. The
principle of universalization as formulated by Kant is a subjective principle that can have a
universal validity only in so far as others share the same moral subjectivity with the moral actor.
Put differently, the Kantian principle of universalization, which takes the form of a subjective
process of generalization, can work only in a homogenous culture in which people share
common intersubjectivity. However, as soon as one moves into a world characterized by
cultural pluralism, say a world which resembles the international society, a different principle of
universalization would be needed. Here, a new version of the Categorical Imperative, such as
the one formulated by Thomas McCarthy, would be more relevant:
Rather than ascribing as valid to all others any maxim that I can will to be a universal
law, I must submit my maxim to all others for purposes of discursively testing its claim
to universality. The emphasis shifts from what each can will without contradiction to be
a general law, to what all can will in agreement to be a universal norm.56
McCarthy’s reformulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, inspired by Habermas’s
Communicative Action, reflects an implicit realization of the increasing cultural fragmentation of
modern consciousness. If the stipulation of explicit agreement for the fulfillment of
communicative action is relevant to cultures that share common intersubjectivity, it is more
urgent in a cross-cultural dialogue. Needless to say that agreements and disagreements in the
context of rational dialogue requires rational justification, and not simply the assertion of
preference and choice.
A cross-cultural dialogue has two aims. First, it helps reduce apprehension, which may
result from excessive speculation and extrapolation from one culture to another, and clarify
cross-cultural misreading and misunderstanding. Secondly, it enriches internal debates in a
particular culture by communicating different experiences, and the critical insights of
outsiders. The value of a Tocqueville’s critical insight into democracy in America, or a
15
Schacht’s critical analysis of Islamic law cannot be overstated. However, for a true dialogue to
take place and to be maintained with a reasonable degree of objectivity, the interlocutors should
recognize the moral autonomy of other cultural groups. This means that the solidarity of
external groups with the substantive views of one of the internal groups locked in moral and
political struggle should not be allowed to take priority over the principle of justice.
HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURAL REFORM,
AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
For human rights principles to take hold in the social and political practices of a political
community, these principles must be rooted in the cultural outlook and moral commitments of
its members. In societies where human rights violations are rampant, such violations may
partially be attributed to the lack of cultural sensitivities and commitments, and partially to
authoritatian regimes which have little or no respect to human rights. In these societies
enforcement of human rights requires a vibrant cultural reform and vigorous political struggle.
It follows that human rights, cultural reform, and political participation are locked forever in a
three-sided dialectical relationship.57 Each of the constituting components of the above
relationship does influence, and is in turn influenced by, the others. This process has been
working slowly but surely in Western societies since the Protestant Reformation took place few
centuries ago. The democratization process should go hand in hand with cultural reform and
increased sensitivity to human rights.
As I argued earlier, a similar process has been going on in Muslim societies for little over
a century now. However, the reformation process in Muslim societies has been complicated by
both direct and indirect influences of the outside world. Intervention of Western powers in the
internal affairs of Muslim countries, whether in the form of colonialism and direct military
intervention, or in the form of unlimited support to authoritarian regimes, has disturbed the
historical process of cultural reform and political liberalization and democratization. During the
Cold War, military dictators received tremendous financial and military support allowing them to
become completely independent from the influence of internal politics and popular support.
And as long as these regimes cooperated to advance the national interests of their respective
patrons they could act with impurity against their people. The human rights of the people were
considered secondary to the interests of superpowers. They were invoked only insofar as they
could be used to advance the national interests of the power that be.
In the Muslim world, cultural reformation is facing stiff resistance from authoritarian
regimes, intent on suppressing the egalitarian and liberating ethos of reform movements. The
suppression of freedom of expression and association by authoritarian regimes in the Muslim
world is responsible, not only for the stifling of cultural debate essential for reform, but also for
the rise of Islamic radicalism. It is not uncommon for radicals to point to the selective
application of human rights ? popularized as double standards — to justify their rejection and
to foster public cynicism.
International human rights are articulated as a means for protecting individual dignity
against an arbitrary power, and to allow a distinct minority to exercise self-determination. Any
attempt by external powers to bring about legal change contrary to the moral values of a people
through the agency of an authoritarian regime in the name of human rights amounts to a
coercive act of moral imperialism, and would make mockery of the very notion of human rights.
Human Rights scholars who are concerned about cultural practices which are in contradiction of
human rights should engage indigenous cultures through an open dialogue to both effect change
and understand the source of limitations. It should also, and perhaps in the first place, focus on
16
exposing efforts by external powers to maintain authoritarian regimes so long as the latter are
willing to protect their “national interest”, even when the support extended to anti-democratic
regimes amounts to inflicting great pain and suffering on countless human beings crushed under
the abusive schemes of their rules.
NOTES
1 The works of Abdullahi A. An-Na’im represent the views of the proponents of cross-cultural dialogue, while
the writings of Rhoda Howard represent those of its opponents.
2 For an excellent discussion on strategic formation, see Edward Said, Orientalism, (N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1979).
3 One such example of an openly prejudicial argument against Islam’s capacity to recognize human rights can be
found in the following argument by the eminent Italian scholar Lurgi Bonanate, who suggests that a non-
Muslim is automatically considered an enemy in an Islamic state: “That the state may recognize other states as
different from itself is one thing: the protection of the wellbeing of a human being who, regardless of his flag, is
entitled to the same guarantees that the state offers its nationals is another. (The only exception to this idea of the state
in the contemporary world is the Islamic one, in which the foreigner is an enemy in so far as he is an infidel, not because he
was born under a different sky!)” See Lurgi Bonanate, Ethics and International Politics, trans. John Irving
(Cambridge, UK.: Polity press, 1995), p. 108. Emphasis added.
4 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Practice, 2nd. Ed. (Westview Press, 1995).
5 Ibid. p. 70.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., P. 11.
9 Muhammad bin Ahmad al-Sarakhsi, Sharh Kitab al-Siyar al-Kabir (Pakistan: Nasrullah mansur, 1405 A.H.), Vol. 4,
p 1530.
10 Ibid. p. 1531.
11 Bassam Tibi, “Islamic law/Shari’a, Human Rights, Universal Morality and International Relations”, Human Right
Quarterly 16 (1994) p. 284.
12 Ibid, p. 286.
13 I return to examine Tibi’s arguments more closely in subsequent section.
14 Reza Afshari “An Essay on Islamic Cultural Relativism in the Discourse of Human Rights”, Human Rights
Quarterly 16 (1994) pp. 235-276.
15 Ibid., p. 254.
16 Ibid., p. 253.
17 See John O. Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World, 2nd ed. (Syracus University Press, 1994), p. 339.
18 Ibid., p. 256.
19 Rhoda Howard “Dignity, Community, and Human Rights”, in Abdullah An-Na’im, ed., Human Rights in Cross-
Cultural Perspectives (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), p. 83.
20 Ibid., p. 94.
21 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 96.
22 Ibid.
23 Haward, “Dignity, Community, and Human Rights”, p. 94.
24 Afshari, “An essay on Islamic cultural Relativism in the Discourse of Human Rights”, p. 256.
25 Daniel Pipes, Oliver Roy, and Fuad Ajami are well-known representatives of this approach.
26 See Fuzlur Rahman, Roots of Islamic neo-Fundamentalism, Fred Halliday, The Politics of Islamic fundamentalism, John
Epositio, Islam and Politics, Lineard Binder, Islamic Liberalism.
27 Mayer, Islam and Human Rights, p. 177.
28 See, for instance, Muhammad Abduh, “Islam, Reason, and Civilization”, in John J. Donohue and John L.
Esposito, Islam in Transition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 24-8.
29 Muhammad Rashid Rida, Huquq al-Nisa’ fi al-Islam [women rights in Islam] (Beirut, Lebanon: Dal al-Hijra,
1987), pp. 12-4.
30 Abdul-Rahman al-Kawakibi, Um al-Qura in Al-a’mal al-Kamila, ed. Muhammad ‘Imarah (Cairo, Egypt: al-Hay’ah
al-Misriyah al-ammah, 1970), p. 261-4. For discussion of the views of early contemporary Muslim reformists,
see Louay M. Safi, The Challenge of Modernity (Leham; Maryland: University Press of America, 1994), pp. 111-
132.
17
31 See for example, Muhammad Al-Ghazali, Huquq al-Insan fi al-Islam.
32 Fahmi Huwaydi, Muwatunum La dhimiyun (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1985).
33 Rashid al-Ghanoushi, al-Huriyyat al-Ammah fi al-Dawah al-Islamiyyah [Public Rights in the Islamic State (Beirut,
Labenon: Markaz Dirasat al-Wihdah al-Arabiyyah, 1993), p. 135.
34 Ibid., p. 132. The list of eminant Muslim scholars and leaders who have adopted reformist views includes, just
to cite few highly influencial people, Fahti Osman, Muhammad Salim al-Awwa, Tariq al-bishri, Ridwan al-
Sayyed, Ishaq Farhan, Anwar Ibrahim, Khalisnur Majid, and Chandra Muzaffar.
35 See Zaki Milad, “al-Fikr al-Islami wa Qadayyah al-Mar’ah” al-Kalimah 21 (1998), pp. 9-24.
36 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 51.
37 Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah, (Cairo, Egypt: Dar al-Fikr, 1983) p. 53.
38 Ibid., p. 71-2.
39 See Ann Belinda S. Prais, “Human Rights as Cultural Practice”, Human Rights Quarterly 18 (1996) 288; Also
Donnelly, Universal Human Rights, p. 109-12.
40 See Max Weber, Economy and Society (University of California press, 1978) , Vol. 1, pp. 1121-1156; also Alasdair
MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth), 1990.
41 Donnelly, Universal Human Rights, p. 110.
42 See Ibid, pp. 117-8; also Abdullahi An-Na’im, “Toward a Cultural Approach to Defining International
Standards of Human Rights,” in A. An-Na’im (ed.), Human Rights in Cross Cultural Perspective (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), p. 25.
43 Richard Falk, “Cultural Foundation for the International protection of Human Rights,” in Abdullahi An-Na’im
(ed.), Human Rights in Cross Cultural perspectives (University of Pennsylvania, 1992), p. 44.
44 Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism (The University of Chicago Press, 1988) p. 9.
45 The unilinear conception of history derives its intellectual force from Hegel’s Philosophy of History.
46 Haward, “Dignity, Community, and Human Rights,” in Abdullahi An-Na’im (ed.), Human Rights in Cross-Cultural
Perspective, p. 99.
47 For an excellent discussion on the impact of social context on the implementation of human rights, see Daniel
A. Bell, “The East Asian Challenge to Human Rights: Reflection on an East West Dialogue, “Human Rights
Quarterly” 18 (1996) 641-667.
48 Bassam Tibi, “Islamic Law/Shari’a, … .”, p. 280.
49 Ibid., p. 280.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., p. 293.
52 Binder, Islamic Liberalism, p. 9.
53 See Jurgen Habermas, Moral Consciousnes and Communicative Action, trans. Chistian Lannardt and Shierry Weber
Nicholsen (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity press, 1990), P. 58.
54 In stipulating objective universalism as a preconditon of a true dialogue, I am drawing on Habermas’s argument
for Discourse Ethics. See Habermas, Moral Consciousness, p. 68.
55 Immanuel Kan, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 84.
56 Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge, mass., 1978), p.326.
57 Richard Falk, “Cultural Foundations for the International Protection of Human Rights”, p. 57-9.